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KNOW RESET - Building Knowledge for a Concerted and Sustainable Approach to Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU and its Member States 
 
The KNOW RESET Project, which is co-financed by the European Union, is carried out by the EUI in 
partnership with ECRE (the European Council on Refugees and Exiles). The general objective of the 
project is to construct the knowledge-base necessary for good policy-making in the refugee 
resettlement domain in the EU and its 27 Member States. It aims to explore the potential to develop 
the resettlement capacity, to extend good practices and to enhance cooperation in the EU.  
KNOW RESET maps and analyses frameworks and practices in the area of refugee resettlement in 
the 27 E U Member States. The team involved in the project, gathering members of the EUI’s and 
ECRE’s large networks, has proceeded with a systematic and comparative inventory of legal and policy 
frameworks and practices related to resettlement in the EU and its 27 Member States, providing the most 
updated set of information. The publication of comparative data and the dissemination of research results 
contribute to raising awareness for refugee resettlement and refugee protection in the EU and provide a 
knowledge-tool for policy-makers, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders interested or 
involved in resettlement activities and policies in the EU and countries of first asylum. The project 
involves too field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia, which will add to the knowledge and the 
assessment of resettlement practices of refugees from countries of first asylum to the EU.  
KNOW RESET has resulted in the first website mapping EU involvement in refugee resettlement. 
It focuses on resettlement in the EU and covers the 27 Member States, involved in resettlement in one 
form or another, and to various degrees. It contains a unique database providing legal, administrative 
and policy documents as well as statistics collected from national authorities by the project team. It 
also includes a series of comparative tables and graphs, the country profiles of the Member States, 
country of first asylum reports, as w ell as t hematic reports and policy briefs. This user-friendly 
website is a valuable instrument for: comparing the varied frameworks, policies and practices within 
the EU; for evaluating the resettlement capacity in the EU; for following the evolution of Member 
States’ commitment in resettlement; and for assessing the impact of the Joint EU Resettlement 
Programme.  
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Abstract 
This report presents the findings of field research in Kenya under the KNOW RESET project, which 
maps and analyses legal and policy frameworks as well as p ractices related to resettlement to 
European countries.  The research in Kenya was a component of this broader project, which included 
research in 27 EU member states and three countries of first asylum: Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. 
Research was carried out in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camp between June and October 2012 and 
involved interviews with refugee and resettlement actors, including those participating in resettlement 
to European countries. The report broadly explores and presents Kenya’s resettlement landscape, the 
positions, roles and practices of European resettlement countries within that landscape, and the 
perspectives and experiences of refugees around resettlement. 
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Executive Summary 
Overview 
This report is the outcome of field research in Nairobi and Kakuma refugee camp which sought to map 
Kenya’s refugee resettlement landscape, with a particular focus on resettlement to European countries. 
The report presents Kenya’s resettlement landscape, the role of European countries within this 
landscape and how European resettlement policies and practices are experienced on the ground from 
the perspectives of UNHCR and its implementing partners. In addition, the report explores refugees’ 
experiences and narratives around resettlement. The report makes recommendations to UNHCR and 
European countries around how European resettlement policies could be improved to ease the burden 
on Kenya as country of first asylum, to increase the efficiency of European resettlement processes in 
Kenya and to render the resettlement process a smoother and less anxiety-producing experience for 
refugees. The research was co-funded by the European Union and managed by the European 
University Institute and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles.  
Background 
Kenya’s refugee population lies at 630,926 refugees and asylum seekers, in addition to an unknown 
but likely high number of de facto refugees. The majority of Kenya’s refugees reside in its two desert 
refugee camps – Dadaab, in North Eastern Province, and Kakuma in North Rift Valley Province – as 
well as a large number in Kenya’s significant cities, most notably Nairobi. 
Kenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees 
as well as the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention. However, up until 2006, 
Kenya lacked any national legislation on refugees. Since the influx of large numbers of refugees from 
neighbouring Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan in the early nineties, Kenya’s official stance towards 
refugees has been characterised by draconian policies aiming to contain the refugee ‘problem’ and 
refugees’ movements, including an encampment policy which restricted refugees and asylum seekers 
to residing in camps. Following sustained advocacy by UNHCR and civil society organisations, in 
2007 Kenya adopted the Refugee Act 2006, through which the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 
OAU Refugee Convention were implemented at the national level. The Act lays out Kenya’s national 
policy towards its refugee and asylum seeking population, yet there continue to be grey areas, such as 
the situations in which refugees are able to reside outside of the camps. Refugees continue to move 
between the camps and the cities unofficially, risking police harassment and arrest. 
Possibilities For Durable Solutions 
UNHCR identifies ‘durable solutions’ to the ‘refugee problem’ as local integration, voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement. In Kenya, opportunities for durable solutions are limited. The country’s 
encampment policy and measures to restrict refugees’ movements significantly curtails opportunities 
for local integration. Refugees face harassment and discrimination in urban centres, especially those 
who have a distinctive appearance, such as South Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians. Furthermore, 
local integration appears not to be an envisaged or desirable solution for the Government of Kenya, 
which regularly makes statements about the burden its Somali refugee population places on the 
country, and has made it clear that the only opportunity it sees for them is repatriation.  
UNHCR facilitated the voluntary repatriation of southern Sudanese refugees from Kakuma 
following the signing of the 2005 CPA between the Sudans, but this has largely been unsuccessful, 
and has since been halted due to large numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan flowing into the 
camp fleeing ethnic violence. Rwandan refugees in Kenya will likely soon face proposals of 
repatriation, since the country is deemed by the international community to now be safe, and the 
Rwandan government has requested their return from neighbouring countries and for UNHCR to 
invoke the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees. But very few of Kenya’s refugees are actually able 
to return to their country of origin, especially its predominantly Somali population.  
Of the three durable solutions, resettlement is often the only real option for refugees in Kenya. Yet, 
it is an opportunity limited to just a fraction of Kenya’s refugees – less than one per cent. Resettlement 
to a third country is generally highly desired by refugees, but for many remains a dream. This dream 
has been fostered and nurtured by resettlement programmes in the camps, through which resettlement 
becomes something tangible and consequently perceived as attainable. This environment encourages 
refugees to perform vulnerability in order to show their eligibility for resettlement to UNHCR, and to 
make projects out of resettlement seeking, which are actively worked on through certain practices or 
methods, such as regular visits to UNHCR and implementing partners, writing letters to submit to 
UNHCR offices and collecting papers documenting their suffering, mistreatment or the unfairness of 
UNHCR’s policies and practices. For refugees in camps especially who may have little control over 
their lives, daily engagement with such a project may be one of few ways they feel able to gain some 
agency and autonomy, and maintain some hope in an otherwise bleak situation. Agencies are 
constantly navigating this environment, trying to uphold their credibility with UNHCR or resettlement 
countries by identifying which refugees are indeed the most vulnerable. The result is a palpable culture 
of disbelief or doubt, whereby refugees are often assumed to be strategically bending the truth in order 
to be resettled. This is strongly felt by refugees, who can feel that they are constantly suspected of 
lying or cheating, and that agencies are trying to catch them out so as to dismiss their claims.  
Kenya’s Resettlement Landscape 
There have historically been two channels through which refugees are resettled from Kenya: due to 
protection needs where no alternative solution can be identified, and through resettlement programmes 
targeting specific groups. Since 2006, UNHCR has been implementing a protracted refugee 
resettlement programme from Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Refugees are selected for resettlement 
interviews based on their year of arrival, starting with the earliest arrivals from 1992 up t o 2006 
arrivals. In Kakuma, the protracted refugee resettlement programme is currently coming to an end, and 
is to be replaced with a more traditional, protection-based resettlement programme. This programme 
will involve colleagues in the community services unit carrying out needs-based assessments of 
refugees, from which refugees potentially in need of resettlement can be identified for referral to the 
resettlement unit.  
Resettlement from Kenya in recent years has largely taken place from Kenya’s (and indeed the 
world’s) largest refugee camp, Dadaab. In previous years, UNHCR’s targets for resettlement were 
high due to the vast numbers of refugees living in Dadaab, many of whom were protracted cases. In 
2011, 10,000 individuals were targeted for resettlement, with 8,000 of  those refugees selected from 
Dadaab. However, heightened insecurity in Dadaab over the past two years has led a number of 
countries to withdraw their personnel from conducting resettlement interviews in the camp, curtailing 
UNHCR’s target figures from Kenya in 2012 to 3,750, with only 750 refugees coming from Dadaab. 
This has created a real challenge for UNHCR, as resettlement countries scramble for refugees from a 
much smaller pool of candidates in order to meet their resettlement quotas. Furthermore, many of 
Dadaab’s protracted refugees are most in need of resettlement, but remain largely inaccessible.  
In 2011, 3,581  refugees departed Kenya to be resettled in a third country and 10,518 refugees’ 
cases were submitted for resettlement. Of those who departed, the vast majority (2, 083) were resettled 
to the U.S., 541 to Canada, 329 to Sweden, 208 to the U.K., 182 to Australia, 81 to the Netherlands, 58 
to Norway, 10 to New Zealand, and 89 to ‘other countries’. Generally, the U.S. and Canada are 
deemed the biggest players in resettlement, followed by Australia, the UK and Sweden.  
 
 
Resettlement To European Countries 
While numbers of refugees resettled to European countries are low, these countries do offer UNHCR 
important alternatives to the U.S.; although the U.S. offers more than enough resettlement places, it is 
unable to process cases quickly, even in emergencies such as immediate protection needs or medical 
issues. European countries, on the other hand, are in special circumstances able to resettle cases in a 
matter of weeks, or sometimes even days. Sweden is renowned as the fastest country of resettlement, 
and has been able to turn cases around within as little as one to two days.  
While European resettlement is highly valued due to countries’ abilities to resettle cases i n short 
spaces of time and their systems of allocating portions of their quotas to dossier cases and emergencies, 
agencies can experience difficulties around the time and resources spent meeting the resettlement needs 
of European countries relative to the number of refugees that these countries resettle. In addition, the 
U.S. experiences a lull in resettlement referrals at the beginning of the year because UNHCR channels all 
of its resources into responding to the missions of European countries. UNHCR operates in this way 
because, in spite of long security checks, the U.S. will accept large numbers and is relatively open 
compared to European countries, which are often deemed to be more choosey. The U.S. in particular 
then tends to get a surge of referrals towards the end of the year, once all European resettlement places 
have been filled. Since the U.S. is UNHCR’s biggest resettlement ‘customer’, the prioritising of 
European countries which resettle much lower numbers can seem illogical. Nevertheless, especially for 
cases urgently requiring resettlement, or groups or nationalities which are less likely to be accepted by 
the U.S., such as Oromo and Eritreans, UNHCR feels that prioritising European countries’ resettlement 
needs is important and necessary. This can result in a hectic first half of the year as referrals are being 
made, until European countries’ missions are completed and quotas are filled, including for dossier and 
emergency cases. Thereafter, UNHCR is able to continue referring cases t o the U.S., and faces the 
difficult situation of keeping any new emergency cases that arise on hold as they await the new fiscal 
year to begin referring to European countries again. This can be particularly stressful, since some of 
these cases may be in life-threatening situations, and yet there tend to be no immediate opportunities for 
resettlement in the second half of the year.  
IOM reported similar challenges around working with European countries, each of which has its 
own systems and schedules which can prove cumbersome to deal with when the numbers actually 
resettled are relatively few. Except for the UK, which budgets for its resettlement programme three 
years in advance, European countries provide IOM with very tentative ‘hints’ about the numbers they 
might resettle when at the planning stage for the following year. IOM can also experience some 
challenges around a lack of standardised procedures from European countries. For example, some 
countries require thorough medical checks from IOM, while others do n ot. A standard medical 
examination for all refugees which would help prevent outbreaks, better screening to avoid 
complications in flight and prevent problems after arrival.  
Kenya’s resettlement infrastructure, which European countries are able to use to meet their own 
resettlement quotas, is almost entirely funded by the U.S. Although this is logical, since the U.S. is 
UNHCR’s and IOM’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, there is a sense that European countries 
should be more committed to supporting this infrastructure financially, since it depends upon it for its 
resettlement requirements. As it stands, should the U.S. stop resettling from the region, this 
infrastructure could not be maintained with the relatively insignificant and ad hoc funding that 
European countries provide; there is a sense that European funding could not be depended upon for 
UNHCR’s or IOM’s operations.  
While European countries are highly valued for their capacity to take dossier and emergency 
submissions and for the speed with which they can resettle refugees, they are also perceived as being 
somewhat ‘choosey’ about the refugees they accept for resettlement, and not necessarily according to 
individuals’ and families’ vulnerability. For example, the UK’s decision this year to only take Oromo 
refugees from Kenya and the Netherlands’ request for non-Somali refugees were experienced 
problematically by UNHCR, since third countries seen to be favouring or discriminating against 
specific ethnic groups undermines UNHCR’s efforts to make resettlement appear fair and entirely 
according to need and causes refugees to complain about what they perceive as bias and racism (see 
following section). Countries assessing the ‘integration potential’ of refugees were also criticised, 
since they tend to select refugees according to their education levels and language skills as opposed to 
on a needs-based assessment. 
Refugee Narratives, Experiences And Perspectives Of Resettlement 
Many more refugees seek resettlement than are actually successful in achieving it, and refugees were 
found to have their own explanations for why some refugees are successful and others are not, or why 
some refugees go through the selection process and depart within a relatively short space of time while 
others can wait for a number of years. Many informants felt that selection and rejection of refugees 
occurs unfairly, which they explained in a number of ways. Some informants suggested that 
resettlement occurs arbitrarily and that selection is largely based on chance or luck, often according to 
the officer one is received by. Unfairness was also articulated as being due to UNHCR and 
resettlement countries favouring certain nationalities or tribes, particularly in Kakuma since refugees 
are acutely aware of who is and who is not being resettled due to the close proximity in which people 
live in the camp. Favouring certain ethnic groups was often explained as racism by informants from 
South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer communities; informants pointed out that ‘brown’ refugees such 
as Oromos and Somalis were being resettled but ‘black’ refugees were not, even if, like the Ethiopian 
Nuer, they shared the same nationality with those who were being resettled such as the Oromo. Some 
informants asserted that other refugees bought or stole other people’s resettlement places, especially in 
the camps, or that people would fake situations of insecurity, or change their ethnicity strategically 
having observed that certain ethnic groups were more favoured than others. Refugees also cited 
mistrust of UNHCR, or suspicion of corruption within the organisation, as being behind resettlement 
decisions. Congolese Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi expressed concern that during interviews 
with UNHCR and resettlement countries their stories were not being accurately translated; interpreters 
tend to be Rwandan Kinyarwanda or Kirundi speakers, languages which are closely related but not 
identical to the Banyamulenge mother tongue – Kinyamulenge. 
These explanations, although in some cases seemingly irrational, do not arise out of nowhere. 
Especially for the Oromo, a history of persecution may lead refugees to mistrust and be paranoid about 
the activities of all authorities. Similarly, for South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer who have fled 
countries where their people have been discriminated against racially, it is understandable that refugees 
would make sense of their apparent unfair treatment through the frame of race. In addition, many 
refugees have come from contexts where corruption is part of everyday business, and so to suspect 
agencies of engaging in corrupt activities around resettlement is quite rational. Corruption accusations 
may also be a legacy of the resettlement scandal of 2000. In addition, a general perception of UNHCR as 
working against refugees may be fostered by its role around RSD; from arrival in Kenya, asylum seekers 
are interviewed and their claims questioned and judged by UNHCR. This goes some way towards 
explaining why UNHCR may receive such strong criticism from refugees as compared to implementing 
partners, which are able to focus their time and resources on supporting refugees as opposed to 
determining whether they qualify to receive their support or not. Accusations of corruption, inhumanity 
and mistreatment by UNHCR or inaccurate translation by foreign interpreters are used by refugees to 
make sense of the often frustratingly slow processes they undergo with the agency, not only for those 
who have resettlement cases but also for those who are seeking the most essential protection tool and 
prerequisite to resettlement, the mandate. Informants were also well aware of the culture of disbelief 
within UNHCR and implementing partners, and resented constantly having to perform their vulnerability 
to prove their eligibility for resettlement under the critical eyes of agency staff.  
 
 
 
A significant number of refugees interviewed had had an initial resettlement interview with 
UNHCR but then had not received any feedback for many months, or even years. In such situations, 
refugees are able to enquire about the status of their cases at field post in Kakuma or resettlement unit 
desking days in Nairobi, though some reported receiving contradictory information from caseworkers. 
For refugees whose cases have moved beyond UNHCR’s assessment and selection process, queries 
about their cases may not be answerable at field post, as t he cases are now with the countries of 
resettlement to which they have been referred.  
A number of refugees who had gone through interviews with RSC and INS had waited for long 
periods of time without any information about their cases, as UNHCR was not always able to inform 
them of the status of their cases. For refugees referred by UNHCR to European countries, acceptance 
is more likely and if they are unsuccessful, refugees are informed within a short space of time. That 
said, one informant who had been recommended for resettlement to the Netherlands was not called for 
interview, which implies that his case was rejected by the Netherlands at the initial screening stage. He 
expressed anger and frustration to have seen others be interviewed without being informed why he 
was not called himself. A number of other informants felt, or had been informed by UNHCR, that their 
complex family situations were causing their cases to be put on hold. Many refugees have come from 
contexts whereby orphaned or abandoned children are absorbed into other family units, whether these 
are part of extended family configurations or wider clan networks. These tend not to be recognised as 
constituting genuine families by UNHCR and resettlement countries, which require proof of their 
authenticity through further investigations.  
Conclusions And Recommendations  
To Unhcr  
• Clearer communication on the statuses of refugees’ cases, especially in situations where they 
are pending for long periods, would help to reduce the confusion and anxiety of this liminal 
period for refugees. Although it is understandable that UNHCR and resettlement countries 
would not communicate the reasons for refugees being rejected resettlement for purposes of 
keeping selection criteria secret (so that refugees are not able to mould their cases to these 
criteria), not knowing why one was rejected, especially after the stress of going through 
multiple interviews, and the resulting lack of closure can be traumatic for refugees. Similarly, 
where refugees are screened out when UNHCR submits the RRFs to a country, they should be 
informed of the fact, and advised why they were not selected for interview.  
• UNHCR and resettlement countries ought to have high standards when it comes to selecting 
interpreters and be mindful of Congolese refugees’ (especially Banyamulenge) concerns 
around translation, ensuring that appropriate interpreters are employed.  
• For refugees and asylum seekers in Nairobi, support with transport costs to multiple interviews 
for both refugee status determination (RSD) and resettlement would ease the financial 
pressures on refugees, especially during the period they await the mandate when they are not 
entitled to other forms of support from UNHCR or implementing partners. UNHCR might also 
establish field offices in enclaves where numerous refugees reside in which RSD and 
resettlement interviews could be conducted.  
To European Resettlement Countries 
• European countries play an important role in Kenya’s resettlement landscape, resettling 
refugees from nationalities which may not be considered by bigger resettlement actors and 
making provisions for emergency and dossier referrals. European countries should increase 
their quotas for emergency and dossier referrals in order to meet the resettlement needs of 
refugees in acute insecurity and medical situations.  
• European countries coordinating and spacing their missions throughout the year would enable 
UNHCR to spread its attention more evenly between resettlement countries and avoid having 
to channel all of its resources into meeting the resettlement requirements of European 
countries at the beginning of the year to the detriment of larger resettlement actors. If 
European countries coordinated their missions together, sending a mixed team from various 
countries two to three times a year, UNHCR’s preparation for and hosting of these missions 
would be more time and cost-effective.  
• European countries would also make IOM’s work easier to plan and manage should they 
provide more notice on the numbers they intend to resettle each year. 
• Standardised medical procedures, coordinated by IOM, would help to reduce the risk of 
outbreaks, complications in flight and health problems on arrival.  
• UNHCR and implementing partners would benefit from more standardised policies of 
European countries; as it stands, countries each have their own policies and requirements, and 
meeting them can prove cumbersome, especially due to the small numbers of refugees that 
these countries resettle and the relatively little funding they provide for these numbers, which 
is often subject to change.  
• UNHCR would save significant time and resources should there be an agreement between all 
resettlement actors about what information is required in the refugee referral form (RRF). 
Currently, UNHCR completes all forms with the maximum information required since it is not 
always clear which countries these forms will be submitted to. Information on the political 
situation in refugees’ countries of origin, for example, could probably be removed from the 
form, since all countries have information and publications on these countries from their own 
foreign offices. UNHCR would also benefit from more notice from European countries about 
their resettlement numbers and the dates of their missions in order to target the RRFs more 
effectively, tailoring each to the needs of the country of submission.  
• In order to assist UNHCR with its human resources issue, European countries could share a 
small clerical office in Nairobi with a Kenyan team through which to channel RRFs, 
coordinate selection missions and arrange interviews. This would be more cost-effective than 
employing UNHCR staff, who are often overqualified for this kind of work.  
• European countries might benefit from sharing best practices on resettlement, including on 
how to conduct missions and on cultural orientation programming. Countries could learn from 
each other by sending personnel to shadow other countries’ resettlement missions in Kenya 
and cultural orientation classes. This would also apply to countries which currently do not  
regularly resettle refugees, or at least do not currently carry out selection missions in Kenya.  
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1. Introduction 
This report forms a component of the research for the Know Reset Project, which maps policy and 
legal frameworks and actual practices related to resettlement to 27 EU member states. The project’s 
broad aim is to build the knowledge for better policy-making around resettlement at the EU-level as 
well as to individual EU member states. In addition to researchers exploring resettlement policies and 
practices from 27 EU member states, the project also involved research from three countries of first 
asylum – Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. This report presents the findings from field research in Kenya.  
The research aimed to explore and understand how resettlement, and specifically European 
resettlement, is operating in Kenya, and how the resettlement policies and practices of UNHCR and 
resettlement countries are experienced on the ground. The research sought the perspectives from a 
range of actors involved in resettlement, including refugees themselves, refugee agencies and 
European consulates in order to gain a comprehensive view of Kenya’s resettlement landscape and the 
position and role of European resettlement within it. Tying together the perspectives of these various 
actors, the research aimed to provide insights into how European resettlement policies could be 
improved to ease the burden on Kenya as co untry of first asylum, to increase the efficiency of 
European resettlement processes in Kenya and to render the resettlement process a smoother and less 
anxiety-producing experience for refugees.  
2. Methodology 
Interviews were carried out with refugees and resettlement actors in two settings in Kenya – Nairobi, 
where, according to UNHCR figures, 55,581 refugees (the significant majority of Kenya’s urban 
refugees) reside, and Kakuma refugee camp, which currently hosts 102,767 refugees and asylum 
seekers.1
In both Nairobi and Kakuma, informants were accessed via research assistants from the 
predominant refugee communities (often community leaders or interpreters for refugee agencies
 While the Dadaab refugee camp complex hosts the vast majority of Kenya’s refugees and 
asylum seekers – 474, 154 – deteriorating security conditions prevented research in the camp. In 
addition, since these security concerns have recently curtailed resettlement from the camp (explained 
further in the following section), Kakuma was felt to be a more conducive site for the study. 
2), 
who were also able to assist with translation. The sample of informants interviewed cannot, then, be 
said to be representative, since they were selected from assistants’ own pools of contacts and 
associates. In addition, it is important to note that often the most vulnerable refugees perhaps most in 
need of resettlement may not be accessible through such channels. Not all informants in either Nairobi 
or Kakuma were yet officially recognised as refugees in Kenya; a number of informants were waiting 
to receive or renew their mandates, and in Nairobi some had avoided UNHCR entirely or chosen not 
to renew expired mandates out of frustration with the long waiting time involved and transportation 
costs of regular trips to UNHCR’s offices. Informants’ accounts could not be directly triangulated with 
or verified by UNHCR records, in part because not all were known or recognised by UNHCR, as well 
as due to confidentiality reasons.3
                                                     
1 UNHCR, 2012d, ‘Kakuma camp population statistics, 5 October 2012’. 
 The value of the data gained from these interviews can be found in 
informants’ narratives and discourses around resettlement, regardless of whether or not what was said 
2
 With the exception of the research assistant for the Somali refugee community in Nairobi who is a Kenyan Somali.  
3 No names were recorded in order to assure informants of the confidentiality of their information, and pseudonyms have 
been used for all refugees. Some informants, however, did request that I record their name in the hope of some kind of 
assistance and follow-up after the interview. In such cases the informants were advised that this would not be possible, 
and any positive outcomes from the research would be more general in terms of resettlement policy than directed towards 
individual refugees or asylum seekers.  
Hannah Elliott 
2 KNOW RESET RR 2012/01 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 
was ‘true’ or ‘false’ according to the practices of UNHCR and other agencies around resettlement. It 
should be noted that, as previous studies have found,4 informants’ responses to the researcher (a 
foreigner) may have been especially emotive in order to elicit a sy mpathetic response, with some 
hopes that this might bring them support, whether material, in the form of advocacy, or with 
resettlement itself; some informants, in spite of being advised of the nature and objectives of the 
research, requested that their names be recorded and submitted to European countries for resettlement. 
One should remain cautious of internalising a ‘culture of disbelief’,5
42 refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed in Nairobi. Eleven of the refugees interviewed 
were officially registered in either Kakuma or Dadaab refugee camps but were living in Nairobi for 
livelihood or education purposes, or had medical conditions which could not be adequately addressed 
in the camps. Others were officially registered as urban refugees by UNHCR and had been granted 
mandates in Nairobi, having signed a f orm declaring their ability to sustain themselves in the city 
independently of UNHCR support. Interviews were mainly conducted with the four predominant 
refugee communities in Kenya
 however, and assuming that all 
refugees create stories in order to seek resettlement. Such a culture certainly exists amongst the case-
hardened staff of UNHCR and other refugee agencies, in which refugees are often viewed as story-
tellers, manipulating the truth and reproducing narratives of victimhood in an attempt to be resettled. 
Refugees’ narratives and discourses around resettlement should not necessarily be read as ‘true’ or 
‘false’, but as offering insights into how the refugee situation is experienced, understood and made 
sense of by refugees.  
6
Interviews in Nairobi were mostly carried out in the enclaves in which the various communities 
predominantly reside. For Somali and Ethiopian refugees, all interviews were conducted in Eastleigh, 
a vibrant and multi-cultural neighbourhood with a booming economy, fuelled in part by Somali 
transnational business ties and diaspora remittances.
: Somalis (of various clans, including minority clans such as Somali 
Bantu, Benadiri and Asharaff), Ethiopian Oromo, Congolese (various ethnic groups from North and 
South Kivu, including Banyamulenge) and Southern Sudanese (4 Dinka and 6 Nuer informants). In 
addition, one Eritrean and one Burundian Tutsi refugee were interviewed in Nairobi. Gender equity 
was sought, with18 women and 24 men interviewed.  
7 The Congolese refugee community, as well as 
the Rwandan and Burundian communities, tend to be less concentrated in one neighbourhood or area 
than Somali and Ethiopian refugees, and reside in numerous estates across Nairobi, including Kayole, 
Kangemi, Kawangware and Satellite, dispersed amongst Kenyan nationals.8 Interviews with 
Congolese refugees were conducted in the city centre and in Kayole in eastern Nairobi. The South 
Sudanese refugee community similarly tends to reside in a number of different areas across Nairobi, 
including Donholm, Komorock, Kawangware, Githurai and Ruiru, amongst others.9
                                                     
4 E.g. Campbell at al, 2006, ‘Congolese refugee livelihoods in Nairobi’.  
 Interviews with 
members of the South Sudanese Nuer community were conducted in Donholm in eastern Nairobi and 
the Dinka community in Kawangware in western Nairobi. Interviews were carried out in public places 
such as ca fes, restaurants and salons as w ell as i n informants’ homes. Some refugees and asylum 
seekers were understandably cautious about sharing their stories, especially in cases where their 
security was threatened (particularly for Oromo refugees who often live in fear of Ethiopian security 
agents said to be operating in the city). However, a majority of informants were compelled to tell their 
stories in great detail, especially around their frustrations with the resettlement situation in Kenya.  
5 As described in Trueman, 2010, ‘Ethiopia exports more than coffee’. 
6 According to UNHCR statistics, 2012a, ‘Statistical summary as of August 2012’.  
7 See Lindley, 2010, The Early Morning Phonecall. While the Ethiopian refugee community is particularly concentrated in 
Eastleigh, there are also significant communities of Amhara refugees in particular in the more upmarket neighbourhoods 
of Jamhuri and Hurlingham. 
8 see Pavanello et al, 2010, ‘Hidden and exposed’, 13.  
9 There is also a significant [wealthier] southern Sudanese community in Kileleshwa, Hurlingham and Jamhuri estates.  
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In Kakuma, refugees and asylum seekers residing mostly in one section of the camp (Kakuma 1) 
were interviewed. Refugee community leaders and interpreters were accessed via UNHCR’s Community 
Service unit, who were then able to introduce the researcher to members of their community to 
interview. In total, 41 refugees and asylum seekers were interviewed in Kakuma: Ethiopians (including 
Oromo, Amhara, Tigray and Ethiopian Nuer), South Sudanese (Dinka and Nuer), Somalis (of various 
clans), Congolese (of various ethnic groups from North and South Kivu) and Burundians (Hutu) were 
interviewed. Most refugees in the camp were very keen to tell their stories. As in Nairobi, it was 
necessary to emphasise my inability as an independent researcher to provide any assistance or refer cases 
to UNHCR. The Oromo community was particularly keen to be interviewed, meaning the number of 
interviews from Oromo refugees and asylum seekers are somewhat disproportionate to the other 
communities. Although gender equity was sought and emphasised, only thirteen women were 
interviewed in the camp. While the challenges accessing women are frustrating, they also emphasise that 
men tend to be more active in pursuing opportunities in the camp.10
Research also involved interviews with UNHCR in both Nairobi and Kakuma, with the Senior 
Resettlement Officer in Nairobi, the Senior Protection Officer and Resettlement Officer in Kakuma, 
and with UNHCR resettlement caseworkers in Dadaaab
 
11 and Kakuma. Discussions were held with 
the head of IOM’s sub-office in Kakuma and IOM’s director of non-US movements was interviewed 
at IOM’s headquarters in Nairobi. In addition, the manager of IOM’s Canadian Orientation Abroad 
programme (also working with European countries’ cultural orientation programmes for resettled 
refugees) was interviewed in Nairobi. A member of staff at the Government of Kenya’s Department of 
Refugee Affairs (DRA) was interviewed in Nairobi, along with refugee agencies, including Refuge 
Point, Kituo Cha Sheria, Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), and Heshima Kenya.12
In order to gain insights into the workings and perspectives around resettlement of those European 
countries resettling from Kenya, interviews were conducted with the consulates of European countries 
resettling refugees from Kenya – the UK, Netherlands and Denmark. I was fortunate to be able to 
observe the Netherlands’ second cultural orientation session for refugees who had been selected for 
resettlement from Nairobi and to discuss the Netherlands’ resettlement policies and practices with staff 
from the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). In addition, I was able to meet 
with members of a delegation from the Swedish Migration Board towards the end of their selection 
mission in Kenya. I also met with caseworkers for the Resettlement Support Centre (RSC) of the U.S. 
in Nairobi for sub-Saharan Africa and interviewed the Refugee Coordinator for State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in order to gain a sense of how European 
resettlement is viewed by UNHCR’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, and what European countries 
can learn from the U.S.’s resettlement policies and practices.  
  
3. Contextual Analysis 
Kenya’s refugee population  
Kenya currently hosts some 630,926 refugees and asylum seekers.13 The majority of the country’s 
refugees reside in its two desert refugee camps – Dadaab, in North Eastern Province, and Kakuma, in 
North Rift Valley Province – and a large number also live in Kenya’s significant cities, most notably 
Nairobi.14
                                                     
10
 My sense was that interviews were treated as a means of campaigning for resettlement. 
 In addition, an unknown but likely high number of de facto refugees live unregistered in the 
country, most commonly in urban centres. 
11 By phone. 
12 More on the place of these agencies within Kenya’s resettlement landscape in section 4. 
13 According to UNHCR’s official statistics: UNHCR, 2012a, ‘Statistical Summary as of August 2012: Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Kenya’. 
14 UNHCR, 2012a. 
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Kenya’s refugee history began with the country’s hosting of Ugandan refugees displaced by 
political coups during the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, Kenya’s official refugee numbers stood at 
15,000; the majority of these were Ugandans who had managed to integrate into the country’s socio-
economic landscape relatively smoothly, acquiring Kenyan identity cards and gaining access to social 
services relative to Kenyans.15 Kenya’s refugee situation changed dramatically with the onset of the 
nineties, which saw a surge in the number of refugees entering Kenya in response to regional crises. 
This began with a wave of an estimated 300,000 Somali refugees between 1991 and 199316 following 
the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1992 into camps at the border at Liboi, north coast (Marafa), 
around Mombasa (Utanga) and the Dadaab camps in North Eastern Province. Shortly after, the 
collapse of the Unity government in Ethiopia displaced around 40,000 Ethiopians into Kenya.17 The 
same year, 12,000 Sudanese minors entered Kenya fleeing the insecurity resulting from the fighting 
between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan, resulting in the creation of Kakuma refugee camp. 
Around this time, Congolese fleeing the Mobutu regime after ten years of fighting were also flowing 
into Kenya.18 By 1992, K enya’s refugee numbers had reached around 420,000, as compared to an 
estimated 13,000 in 1991.19
Refugee flows into Kenya continued into the nineties and beyond. New arrivals of Somalis into the 
country persisted through 2006, in spite of the government’s closing of the border, as people fled the 
insecurity brought by the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union by US-sponsored Ethiopian and 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces.
 The majority of these refugees were Somali. 
20 There have been further waves of Somali refugees 
entering Kenya in recent years, with thousands fleeing the devastating drought of 2011 w hich was 
compounded by restrictions placed on aid imposed by insurgent group Al Shabaab who controlled 
some of the worst-hit areas.21 The crisis saw numbers in Dadaab refugee camp swell to 400,000, 
making it Kenya’s ‘second biggest city’, hosting over four times more than its original capacity of 
90,000 people.22 UNHCR’s mid-term objective for South Sudanese refugees since the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been repatriation, though this is generally deemed to 
have been a problematic process to say the least. Although UNHCR supported those who voluntarily 
repatriated with integration grants, they were not given repatriation packages, and many returnees 
found a lack of infrastructure and services and poor living conditions at ‘home’. In addition, ethnic 
conflicts in South Sudan saw significant numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan, which has halted 
UNHCR’s repatriation programme.23
Today, Somalis make up the significant majority of refugees in Kenya, with their numbers 
officially at 535,318, the majority residing in the Dadaab refugee camp complex.
  
24
                                                     
15 Crisp, 1999, ‘A state of insecurity’, 17. 
 Ethiopian refugees 
follow; UNHCR figures state that 35,873 Ethiopian refugees live in Kenya, mainly in Dadaab but with 
significant numbers in Nairobi, though these figures are not disaggregated according to the different 
Ethiopian ethnic groups in Kenya. South Sudanese refugees are the third biggest refugee population in 
Kenya at 32,146, the vast majority officially residing in Kakuma, though fieldwork for this study 
16 Kirui and Mwaruvie, 2012, ‘The dilemma of hosting refugees’.  
17 Hyndman and Nylund. 1998, ‘UNHCR and the status of prima facie refugees in Kenya’, 4. 
18 Konzolo, 2010, ‘An overview of refugee status determination and the rights of refugees in Kenya’, 2.  
19 Odhiambo-Abuya, 2004, ‘UNHCR and status determination imtaxaan in Kenya’, 188. 
20 See Lindley, 2009, ‘Leaving Mogadishu’. 
21 The Kenyan government has tended to portray Somali refugees who arrived in 2011 as economic refugees fleeing hunger, 
with the argument that their repatriation should thus be relatively unproblematic. See Long, 201, ‘Kenya, Jubaland and 
Somalia’s refugees.  
22 Rice, 2011, ‘Somali refugee settlement swells’. 
23 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
24 Made up of Dagahelay, Hagadera and Ifo I and II camps.  
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suggests that unofficial numbers in Nairobi are significant. Congolese are the fourth biggest refugee 
community in the country, officially at 12,742, the majority officially registered in Nairobi, though 
some 5,500 reside in Kakuma. Other refugee communities in Kenya are Sudanese (6,052), Burundian 
(3,808), Eritrean (1,980), Rwandan (1,783) and Ugandan (1,041). The table in Annex 1 presents 
UNHCR’s records for the populations of refugees of different countries of origin in Kenya from 2008 
to 2012, with a breakdown of these figures according to where refugees officially reside.  
Research sites contexts 
Kakuma refugee camp 
The number of refugees and asylum seekers residing in Kakuma currently stands at 102,76725, 
surpassing the camp’s original capacity of 100,000. The camp was established in 1992 to host 
Sudanese refugees, including the ‘Lost Boys’ who were orphaned or displaced during the Sudanese 
Civil War. Populations from South Sudan continue to constitute a large proportion of the camp’s 
refugees; during the first seven months of this year, Kakuma received 12,123 new arrivals, mostly 
from South Sudan’s Jonglei and South Kordofan states.26
Kakuma is located in Turkana District in the arid lands of the north Rift Valley, the poorest and 
most marginalised district in Kenya. 94.3 per cent of the pastoralist host population, the Turkana, were 
classified as living in poverty in a 2011 survey,
 Somalis represent the largest number of 
refugees in the camp, followed by South Sudanese, Ethiopians and Congolese. The camp is made up 
of three main sections – Kakuma 1, 2 and 3. 
27 and have tended to resent the refugee population for 
having a relatively better quality of life as a result of the rations, housing, education and healthcare 
services provided by UNHCR and implementing partners.28 Attacks on refugees by armed Turkana 
have historically been a major source of insecurity in the camp and, though having significantly 
improved in recent years, remain an issue. 29
                                                     
25 UNHCR, 2012d. 
 A number of refugees interviewed in Nairobi who had 
previously resided in Kakuma cited attacks by Turkana as their main reasons for moving to the city. 
Refugees also struggle with the harsh climatic conditions in the camp – high temperatures and dust 
storms render the area an extremely challenging place to live. Although this was also said to have 
improved slightly in recent years due to improved rainfall levels, increased rainfall also brings floods 
to the camp, and refugees’ houses have been swept away during wet seasons. Such challenges account 
for why many refugees choose to reside in urban centres, even as they remain registered in the camps.  
26 UNHCR, 2012b, ‘Kakuma camp in Kenya surpasses its 10,000 capacity’.  
27 Omari, 2011, ‘Kajiado named richest town in new ranking’.  
28 See Aukot, 2003, ‘It is better to be a refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma’. 
29 At the time of fieldwork in Kakuma, a refugee had been killed in the Kakuma 3 section of the camp the previous week. 
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Nairobi 
The official number of refugees residing in Nairobi according to UNHCR’s most recent statistics is 
55,581,30
Somalis, more than other refugee populations, face discrimination from the host population in 
Kenya, in part informed by a historical marginalisation and suspicion of the country’s native Somali 
populations as well as more recent events which have caused Somalis or those with Somali-like 
appearances to be associated with Islamic radicalism. In October 2011, following a sp ate of 
kidnappings of foreigners (aid workers and tourists) on its territory, the Kenya Defence Force 
embarked on a military incursion into Somalia with the objective of removing militant group Al 
Shabaab. Kenya’s involvement in the ‘war on terror’ prompted numerous grenade and gun attacks 
across Kenya, mostly in the north eastern town of Garissa and in Nairobi, targeting bus stations, busy 
streets and churches.
 but the actual number is likely to be significantly higher, since many are registered in the camps 
but choose to live in Nairobi for livelihood and educational purposes, or because of medical needs.  
31 These attacks have seen an increase in xenophobic attitudes towards those with 
Somali appearance32 and police harassment of Somalis in Eastleigh estate, where a large concentration 
of Somalis reside. Ethiopian refugees, often residing in Eastleigh, also face discrimination since they 
have a d istinctive appearance and can be mistaken for Somalis. These groups thus face particular 
insecurity in Nairobi at the hands of the police, who regularly conduct night-time ‘operations’ in 
Eastleigh in order to cleanse the estate of illegal immigrants. This has culminated in recent months in a 
Kenya police project known as Operation Fagia Wageni (literally ‘operation sweep up the guests’), in 
which all immigrant populations residing in Eastleigh are targeted. Police operations in Eastleigh are 
not necessarily entirely aimed at removing illegal immigrants; police have been accused of visiting the 
estate when they are short of cash, knowing that refugees and asylum seekers lacking documentation 
will readily pay a bribe so as to avoid being detained.33 South Sudanese, residing in other areas of the 
city, also experience regular requests for identification from the police due to their distinctive 
appearance. Documentation is a grey area, and few police are clear on what documentation refugees 
should be carrying to allow their residence in Nairobi.34
Some groups cited insecurity in Kakuma as a r eason for choosing to stay in the city. Three 
Congolese Banyamulenge informants talked of relatives who had died during the massacre of 
Banyamulenge refugees at Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi and said that they thus felt unable to 
stay in a camp and could not trust UNHCR to keep them safe.
 Refugees from all communities interviewed 
cited experiencing difficulties with the police, but most notably those groups who were more visible in 
Nairobi; refugees from the Great Lakes region who can be mistaken as Kenyans and sometimes speak 
Kiswahili were less likely to report these kinds of incidents.  
35
                                                     
30 UNHCR, 2012a. 
 Ethiopian refugees described 
particular insecurity and anxiety due to targeted attacks on them, including forced deportations, carried 
out by Ethiopian security agents or Kenyan police funded by the Ethiopian government. Most said that 
31 Note that it is unclear as to whether these attacks have been Al Shabaab-instigated or are rather the activities of 
opportunistic individuals and groups in Kenya.  
32 An extreme example is when Somalis were attacked in the street and their homes in Pangani estate in Nairobi which 
neighbours Eastleigh following a grenade attack on a  church which killed one child and injured several others on 30 
September 2012.  
33 Harper, 2010, ‘Somalis in Kenya: they call us ATM machines’.  
34 Pavenello et al, 2010: 17. 
35 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Marc, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 
August 2012. 
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to live in Kakuma, closer to the border, was more dangerous, and that hence they were forced to stay 
in Eastleigh, though some mentioned seeking safe haven in other parts of the country.36
Legal framework for refugees in Kenya 
  
Kenya has signed and ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees as 
well as the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention. However, up until 2006, Kenya 
lacked any national legislation on refugees. While Kenya’s early refugee policy has been described as 
open and accommodating, since 1990 it has been characterised by draconian policies which aimed to 
contain the refugee ‘problem’ and refugees’ movements. Due to overwhelming numbers of refugees in 
the country by 1992, the Government of Kenya (GOK) assigned all responsibility for registering, 
determining the status and ensuring the protection of asylum seekers during this period to UNHCR. 
The government applied containment policies to its refugee population, targeted particularly at the 
growing Somali refugee population; refugees were allowed to reside only in camps, and those needing 
to travel out of the camps for medical needs, to take up education opportunities or fleeing specific and 
targeted insecurity in the camps were required to carry a movement pass issued by UNHCR.37
Following sustained advocacy by UNHCR and civil society organisations, in 2007 Kenya adopted 
the Refugee Act 2006, through which the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention were implemented at the national level.
  
38 The Act identifies two categories of refugees: 
statutory refugees and prima facie refugees, and lays out the provisions for those who should be 
excluded from gaining refugee status or should have their refugee status withdrawn from them, 
including people who have committed crimes against peace or humanity; have committed war crimes 
or serious non-political crimes outside or inside Kenya; have been guilty of acts contrary to the 
principles of the UN or AU; have dual nationality. In addition, where the circumstances which caused 
an individual to flee have changed, the individual should be excluded from receiving refugee status.39 
The Refugee Act also makes room for some deviation from Kenya’s de facto encampment policy, 
allowing refugees to reside in urban areas provided that they are able to sustain themselves financially. 
However, Pavanello et al argue that Kenya continues to lack the national refugee and asylum policy 
required to assist with the implementation of the Refugee Act, and that there is as a result palpable 
confusion around the government’s official position on where refugees should reside.40
The Refugee Act established a government department responsible for refugee issues, the 
Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA), which operates within the Ministry of State for 
Immigration and Registration of Persons. The Refugee Act declares that the DRA is responsible 
for the management, coordination and administration of refugee issues, including developing 
policies, seeking durable solutions, coordinating international assistance, issuing travel documents 
and managing the refugee camps. The vision for the DRA was to take over from UNHCR as lead 
agency on refugee issues in Kenya; all issues pertaining to refugees should first come to the DRA, 
after which the DRA could then assign responsibility for those issues to stakeholder agencies, 
including UNHCR.
 While some 
refugees are today able to legally reside outside of the camps, there are no official guidelines around 
which refugee groups may or may not.  
41
                                                     
36 Boru, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012. 
  
37 Crisp, 1999: 28.  
38 see GOK, 2006, The Refugee Act 2006, Section 16 (1) (a). 
39 GoK, 2006: 3. 
40 Pavanello et al, 2010. 
41 Interview with DRA official, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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Since March 2011, asylum seekers have been required to register with the DRA.42 On arrival in 
Kenya, asylum seekers have up to 30 days to report to DRA reception centres distributed across the 
country – in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, Shauri Moyo neighbourhood in Nairobi, Nakuru in 
Rift Valley, Mombasa and Malindi in Coast Province, and Isiolo in Eastern Province. Here, asylum 
seekers’ essential information, photographs and fingerprints are taken and they are given a letter 
confirming their registration as they await a government alien ID card.43 The new system is felt to be 
positive, in that it demonstrates greater responsibility-sharing between the GOK and UNHCR. 
However, the system has also been found to be inefficient; refugees wait long periods before being 
issued with the ID card, and one informant reported a current backlog of 60,000 refugee ID cards.44 
Recently, the government announced that all refugees being resettled to third countries are required to 
hold alien ID cards,45
Having registered with the DRA and been issued with an asylum seeker certificate, asylum seekers 
from southern Somalia and South Sudan are automatically granted refugee status as prima facie 
refugees. Asylum seekers from other countries or regions undergo an eligibility interview for statutory 
refugee status (refugee status determination, or RSD). This process continues to be conducted by 
UNHCR, though both the RSD process and issuance of mandates will ultimately be the responsibility 
of the DRA and UNHCR and the GOK are currently engaged in capacity building in order to make 
this transition.
 which will likely be problematic in light of the backlog issue.  
46 There has been some criticism of UNHCR’s role in RSD, with the view that acting as 
‘judge and jury’ compromises UNHCR’s fairness and neutrality, and promotes mistrust in the agency 
by refugees themselves.47 This mistrust and suspicion was certainly a common theme of interviews 
with asylum seekers in both Nairobi and Kakuma. The RSD process can vary; according to UNHCR, 
if one’s case is straightforward, an asylum seeker may be required to go through only one interview, 
but if there are some areas of ambiguity in one’s case, one may be recalled for several further 
interviews before a decision is made approving or rejecting an asylum seeker for refugee status. In 
addition, asylum seekers may be called for an RSD registration interview ahead of an actual RSD 
interview.48 Those who are approved as refugees are issued with a mandate which is valid for two 
years, after which a refugee must seek its renewal from UNHCR. A number of refugees and asylum 
seekers interviewed in both Nairobi and Kakuma spoke of numerous eligibility interviews with 
UNHCR and long waits for a decision, sometimes for several years. This can put a lot pressure on 
refugees in Nairobi in particular, who have to source transport costs to UNHCR’s offices, often only to 
be told to return the following week. Those who are rejected are given a 30 day period to appeal to an 
Appeals Board, after which they are required to leave the country, a policy that was created under the 
2006 Refugee Act.49
                                                     
42 Interview with RCK, Nairobi, 20 July 2012.  
 Those who are successful are granted the mandate and receive a R efugee 
Identification Pass. Those residing in the camps who are granted refugee status are issued with a ration 
card and are entitled to all of the support services available in the camp. Should they wish to leave the 
camps, their reason to do so must be approved by the DRA, after which they are issued with a 
43 The alien card is a p ositive development in terms of refugees’ documentation since it allows for better treatment by 
Kenyan police, especially for urban refugees.  
44 Pavanello et al, 2010: 15; interview with RCK, 20 July 2012. 
45
 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 October 2012.  
46 ‘Refugee Status Determination’ , DRA website, www.refugees.co.ke  
47 Konzolo, 2010: 11. Odhiambo-Abuya, 2004, describes how amongst Somalis the RSD process is known as imtaxaan 
which translates as ‘examination’.  
48 Communication with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 16 O ctober 2012. According to UNHCR, delays occur when a 
refugee’s case is not straightforward – i.e. when there are some areas of ambiguity, e.g. non-biological children. The 
refugee may be called for several interviews, which span a long period of time. What is not clear is the extent to which 
these long waits are because of the complexity of the case alone, or also due to UNHCR’s staffing issues which can cause 
inefficiency in the system. 
49
 Konzolo, 2010: 13 
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movement pass.50 Refugees in Nairobi who are granted the mandate are able to access services offered 
by refugee agencies, such as medical and food assistance (HIAS, Refuge Point, GIZ) and legal aid and 
advocacy (Kituo Cha Sheria, RCK), though it is the policy of UNHCR to advise refugees that they 
will have more reliable access to services in the camps. On receiving the ration card, refugees may 
unofficially go to Nairobi, leaving their card number with family or friends so that they can be 
contacted in the event of being called for an interview, including for resettlement, when they return to 
the camps. Refugees also return to the camps from Nairobi for headcounts in order to maintain their 
official residency there as well as to keep their ration card or their name on a family member’s card.51
Possibilities for durable solutions for Kenya’s refugees 
  
UNHCR identifies ‘durable solutions’ to the ‘refugee problem’ as local integration, voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement. In Kenya, opportunities for durable solutions are limited. The country’s 
encampment policy and measures to restrict refugees’ movements significantly curtails opportunities 
for local integration socially, politically and economically. As mentioned above, refugees face police 
harassment and discrimination in urban centres, especially those who have a d istinctive appearance, 
such as South Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians. Furthermore, local integration appears not to be an 
envisaged or desirable solution for the Government of Kenya, which regularly makes statements about 
the burden its Somali refugee population places on the country, and has made it clear that the only 
opportunity it sees for them is repatriation.52
The role of resettlement 
 As described above, UNHCR facilitated the voluntary 
repatriation of southern Sudanese refugees from Kakuma following the signing of the 2005 CPA 
between the Sudans, but this has largely been unsuccessful, and has since been halted due to large 
numbers of new arrivals from South Sudan flowing into the camp fleeing ethnic violence. Rwandan 
refugees in Kenya will likely soon face proposals of repatriation, since the country is deemed by the 
international community to now be safe, and the Rwandan government has requested their return from 
neighbouring countries and for UNHCR to invoke the cessation clauses for Rwandan refugees. Very 
few of Kenya’s refugees are actually able to return to their country of origin, especially its 
predominantly Somali population.  
Of the three durable solutions, resettlement is often the only real option for refugees in Kenya. Yet, 
it is an opportunity limited to just a fraction of Kenya’s refugees – less than one per cent.53 Amongst 
refugees and asylum seekers, the term ‘durable solutions’ is often synonymous with resettlement, or 
used as a eu phemism when requesting resettlement.54
                                                     
50 Pavanello et al, 2010: 15. 
 Resettlement to a third country is generally 
highly desired by refugees, but for many remains a dream. Jansen describes how this dream has been 
fostered through resettlement programmes in Kakuma, during which resettlement has become highly 
visible through the posting of refugees’ ration card numbers on not ice boards calling them for 
resettlement interviews and the flights departing the camp carrying individuals and families who have 
been selected for resettlement. The dream is made even more tangible through modern technologies 
51 Campbell, 2006, ‘Urban refugees in Nairobi’, 400. 
52 Long, 2011. 
53
 According to UNHCR figures for 2011, 0.6 per cent of the country’s refugee population was resettled in 2011. 
UNHCR, 2012a. 
54 While refugees and asylum seekers may not directly request resettlement, knowing that this is not normally favourable 
with refugee agencies, they might say that they are looking for ‘durable solutions’. Discussions with staff at Kituo Cha 
Sheria, 25 July 2012; with staff at the US Resettlement Support Centre (RSC), 7 July 2012. Even those who are not 
recognised as refugees or have not entered the RSD process may be familiar with the language associated with refugee 
situations such as ‘durable solutions’ and draw upon this language strategically when seeking support.  
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such as international telecommunications, the internet and international money transfer, through which 
refugees in the camp are able to communicate with their ‘lucky’ friends and relatives abroad. Jansen 
argues that this creates an environment in the camp that encourages refugees to “cheat” and “negotiate 
vulnerability” through insecurity claims; resettlement is viewed as so mething that can actively be 
attained rather than an option only for the most vulnerable few.55
4. The Resettlement Landscape In Kenya 
 Agencies are constantly navigating 
this environment, trying to uphold their credibility with UNHCR or resettlement countries by 
identifying which refugees are indeed the most vulnerable. The result is a palpable culture of disbelief 
or doubt, whereby refugees are often assumed to be strategically bending the truth in order to be 
resettled. At the same time, this culture is strongly felt by refugees, who resent having to perform 
vulnerability to prove their eligibility for resettlement under the critical eyes of agency staff, and feel 
that they are constantly suspected of lying or cheating with agencies trying to catch them out so as to 
dismiss their claims.  
History of refugee resettlement from Kenya 
There have historically been two channels through which refugees are resettled from Kenya: due to 
protection needs where no alternative solution can be identified, and through resettlement programmes 
targeting specific groups. In cases of referrals due to protection needs, these may be identified by 
UNHCR’s functional units56 such as the Protection and Community Services Units or implementing 
partners who are working with refugees in a supportive capacity (e.g. providing legal aid, food aid, 
accommodation, etc.) and see that an individual or family has protection needs that cannot be met any 
way other than resettlement. In addition, there are avenues through which refugees can make their 
protection needs known to UNHCR or implementing partners via visiting UNHCR’s protection unit in 
Nairobi on ‘desking’ days (days when officers from UNHCR units are able to receive refugees in 
person in order for them to raise any issues they may have) or via field post in the camps (similarly to 
desking days, UNHCR units each have an assigned day when officers are available to receive refugees 
in person to discuss any issues). Refugees in both Nairobi and Kakuma may also communicate any 
protection needs with the police, who may then refer the case on to an appropriate UNHCR unit.57
Resettlement programmes shift according to current political situations and agendas. Towards the 
end of 2000, 3,800 southern Sudanese unaccompanied minors known as the ‘Lost Boys’ were resettled 
to the U.S. from Kakuma under the United States Refugee Programme (USRP). In 2003, 15,000  
Somali Bantu refugees were resettled from Kakuma.
 
Diagrams in Annexes 4 a nd 5 pr esent the pathways through which refugees may be resettled from 
Kakuma and Nairobi. 
58
During interviews with refugees and asylum seekers, references were sometimes made to 
corruption within the resettlement system during the late nineties / early 2000s, whereby refugees who 
were to be resettled had their cases ‘stolen’ or sold to others who were able to go in their places.
 As described below, in recent years refugees in 
Kakuma and Dadaab have been prioritised for resettlement according to their year of arrival in order to 
address the protracted refugee situation in Kenya.  
59
                                                     
55 Jansen, 2008, ‘Between vulnerability and assertiveness’.  
 The 
56
 UNHCR’s functional units comprise of the Protection Unit, the Community Services Unit and the Resettlement Unit. 
57
 Communication with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 16 October 2012. 
58 Jansen, ibid. 
59 Leila and Mohamed [Somali], interview Nairobi, 27 July 2012; Yusuf [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; Sagale 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; James [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012. 
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possibilities for this kind of fraud have more recently been limited by biometric registration systems.60 
There were also allegations of fraud within the resettlement system around this time which were made 
publicly known following an investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, requested 
by UNHCR. The investigation revealed that up to 70 U NHCR employees in Nairobi accepted 
monetary bribes from refugees seeking resettlement in third countries.61 Since, checks and balances 
have been put in place to limit opportunities for corruption.62
Contemporary resettlement situation 
  
In 2011, 3,581 refugees departed Kenya to be resettled in a third country and 10,518 refugees’ cases 
were submitted for resettlement.63 Of those who departed, the vast majority (2, 083) were resettled to 
the U.S., 541 to Canada, 329 to Sweden, 208 to the U.K., 182 to Australia, 81 to the Netherlands, 58 to 
Norway, 10 to New Zealand, and 89 to ‘other countries’.64
While the U.S. is by far the most significant country of resettlement based on the numbers of 
refugees it resettles, the process of resettlement to America is renowned amongst UNHCR, other 
refugee agencies and refugees alike to be long and often drawn-out. This is in large part due to the 
extensive security checks required by the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS).
 Generally, the U.S. and Canada are deemed 
the biggest players in resettlement, followed by Australia, the UK and Sweden.  
65 UNHCR and 
implementing partners refer cases to be resettled to the U.S. via the Resettlement Support Centre 
(RSC) in Nairobi. RSC caseworkers are then responsible for carrying out interviews with these 
refugees, and gathering the information required by the U.S.’s Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(INS), which then select refugees for interview based on the information gathered. At the same time, 
CIS conducts security checks on each of the cases. Through this process, refugees are rarely resettled 
to the US within a year, and Somali refugees usually face a significantly longer waiting period as 
compared to other nationalities.66 UNHCR states that the average processing time between 
resettlement submission and departure of non-Somali refugees in Kenya stands at 358 days, but that 
for Somalis this processing time takes 617 days.67
Numbers of refugees resettled by European countries, as shown in Annexes 4 and 5, appear to be a 
drop in the ocean. European countries do offer UNHCR important alternatives to the U.S., however; 
although the U.S. offers more than enough resettlement places, it is unable to process cases quickly, 
even in emergencies such as immediate protection needs or medical issues. European countries, on the 
other hand, are in special circumstances able to resettle cases in a matter of weeks, or sometimes even 
days. Sweden is renowned as the fastest country of resettlement, and has been able to turn cases 
around within as little as one to two days.
 These figures are heavily skewed towards US 
figures, given the numbers of refugees the US resettles. 
68
                                                     
60 Interview with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
  
61 Kirby, 2002,’Crime did pay in Kenyan UN office’.  
62 Such as protection panels, which ensure that staff from different UNHCR units assess the appropriateness of resettlement 
as a durable solution for an individual or family. Interview with Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
63 see Annexes 2 and 3 for tables showing numbers of refugees submitted for resettlement and actual departures from 2007-
2012, showing numbers according to Kenya’s refugee population 
64 see Annex 3 f or a breakdown of refugee departures to different third countries for 2007-2012 and Annex 2 f or a 
breakdown of refugees whose files were submitted for resettlement to different third countries for 2007-2012 
65 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Nairobi, 11 
September 2012.  
66
 Because of the risks associated with Somalis due to the presence of Al Shabaab in Somalia.  
67 UNHCR, 2012c, ‘Updated fact sheets on priority situations for the strategic use of resettlement’. 
68 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 A ugust 2012; Swedish Migration Board delegation, 
Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
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Resettlement processes from the camps and Nairobi 
Camps 
In recent years there have been two streams through which refugees are referred for resettlement from 
the camps. Since 2006, UNHCR has been implementing a protracted refugee resettlement programme 
from Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Refugees are selected for resettlement interviews based on their 
year of arrival, starting with the earliest arrivals from 1992 up to 2006 arrivals. The reason for making 
the cut-off year 2006 was in order for the programme to have a boundary and time limit (as opposed to 
the year 2006 having any particular significance in itself). Cases are most commonly referred to the 
U.S. or Canada, since the numbers are significant and tend not to be urgent. South Sudanese were not 
included in the protracted resettlement programme due to the country’s anticipated independence 
which officially came about in July 2011.  
Alongside the protracted refugee resettlement programme, refugees continue to be considered by 
UNHCR according to their protection needs and if there is no solution other than resettlement can be 
found for them.69 This is the only channel through which urban refugees can be referred for 
resettlement; resettlement programmes tend only to apply in camps. Refugees can be referred to the 
Resettlement Unit via their own self-referral to the Protection Unit or Community Services Unit or via 
UNHCR’s implementing partners. In addition, refugees may be referred to the Resettlement Unit by 
UNHCR colleagues in other units or implementing partner agencies according to their knowledge 
about refugees’ protection needs. Refugees may write and submit letters to UNHCR explaining their 
protection needs, which is often seen as a means through which to ‘apply’ for resettlement. These 
letters are supposed to be read by the Protection Unit, which then proposes a solution for the issue, 
such as referral to the Kenyan police, camp security, Community Services Unit, etc. In general, 
writing letters is not an effective conduit for resettlement, perhaps because it is seen as a way through 
which refugees can actively seek resettlement and is a channel not always accessible to the most 
vulnerable; refugees who write letters must be literate and have knowledge of English, or else know 
someone who can assist them with writing the letter, or even be able to pay for that service.70 In 
addition, UNHCR can be understaffed and when swamped with letters may not always read them. In 
situations where agency workers (UNHCR units or implementing partners) are unable to see 
alternative durable solutions for cases other than resettlement, cases are referred to a protection panel, 
constituted of staff from the protection unit, community services unit and field staff through which 
cases are discussed and a solution agreed to – be it resettlement, relocation to another section of the 
camp, relocation to Nairobi, and so on. The panel functions as a system of checks and balances to 
ensure fairness in the resettlement process and eradicate any opportunities for corruption, and meets 
when a certain number of cases have been referred. On the whole, alternative solutions to resettlement 
are found by the panel, and the resettlement unit receives a relatively small number of referrals this 
way.71
 
 Where refugees have entered the resettlement process through a needs or protection-based 
channel, if they are unsuccessful at the UNHCR stage they are unlikely to be informed why, since that 
would risk information about resettlement criteria leaking to the wider refugee population and people 
adjusting their cases accordingly. My impression was that was also the policy where refugees are 
rejected resettlement at the stage of interviews with third countries. Not being informed why one is 
rejected resettlement is, understandably, incredibly frustrating for refugees.  
                                                     
69
 The pathways through which refugees may be resettled are presented in a diagram in Annex 4.  
70 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
71 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
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In Dadaab, the protracted refugee resettlement programme has been significantly delayed due to the 
current security situation in the camp,72 as discussed below. In Kakuma, the protracted refugee 
resettlement programme is currently coming to an end, and is to be replaced with a more traditional, 
protection-based resettlement programme.73 This programme will involve colleagues in the 
community service unit carrying out needs-based assessments of refugees, from which refugees 
potentially in need of resettlement can be identified for referral to the resettlement unit. The reasoning 
behind this process being conducted by the community service unit as opposed to staff in the 
resettlement unit is to avoid arousing refugees’ awareness that the needs-based assessment is a channel 
for resettlement, and adjusting their statements accordingly. UNHCR is constantly faced with the 
challenge of rendering the resettlement selection process as credible as possible.74
Nairobi 
  
In Nairobi, refugees may be referred to UNHCR’s Resettlement Unit via UNHCR’s functional units 
(Protection Unit or Community Services Unit) or via UNHCR’s implementing partners. Some 
implementing partners have resettlement referrals to UNHCR and agencies with memorandums of 
understanding with third countries to refer refugees to them directly (bypassing UNHCR) as part of 
their mandates, whilst others would only make referrals in situations where they identify extreme 
need. The Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), for example, as well as mainly dealing with the 
provision of legal assistance to refugees, also refers clients for resettlement. RCK may refer clients to 
UNHCR, as well as to partners who are able to make direct referrals to countries of resettlement, for 
example HIAS (to Canada75), and Refuge Point (to the U.S.).76 Kituo Cha Sheria, also a legal aid 
agency, has a collateral agreement with UNHCR to refer cases to UNHCR for further investigation 
vis-à-vis possibilities for resettlement.77 Heshima Kenya, an organisation concerned with the 
protection of unaccompanied refugee children and youth in Nairobi, would refer services users to 
UNHCR only in cases of extreme insecurity.78 The reasoning behind agencies such as Refuge Point 
and HIAS having memorandums of understanding with the larger resettlement countries is in part in 
order to ensure that vulnerable individuals who cannot be reached by or gain access to UNHCR can 
still be given opportunities for resettlement, and in order to help those resettlement countries to reach 
their resettlement targets. This is mainly a service targeting urban refugees as opposed to taking place 
in the camps,79 and operates through other support programmes such as food and medical assistance or 
psycho-social support. Here, opportunities for resettlement are not usually made explicit, though most 
refugees are quite aware that these opportunities exist. As in Kakuma, at the UNHCR offices in 
Westlands, Nairobi, there is a facility through which refugees can submit letters describing their 
challenges in Kenya, though interviews suggested that refugees are rarely given responses. Generally, 
fewer cases are referred for resettlement from Nairobi. This is in part due to the Kenya office’s 
reluctance to resettle urban refugees, preferring to refer them to the camps unless they have high 
profile cases, such as targeted persecution, or medical issues.80
                                                     
72 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Caseworker, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
 In addition, urban refugees are felt to 
73 UNHCR, 2012c; interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
74 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012.  
75 Though HIAS is exploring establishing an arrangement whereby it can also support the U.S. with meeting its resettlement 
needs and refer cases directly to the U.S., because Canada has in recent years curtailed its resettlement numbers, thus 
reducing funding to HIAS. 
76 Interviews with RCK, 20 July 2012; Refuge Point, 24 July 2012. 
77 Interview with Kituo Cha Sheria, 26 July 2012.  
78 Interview with Heshima Kenya, 18 July 2012.  
79 Though in the camps staff may be seconded to support UNHCR with resettlement referrals, such as RSC and Refuge Point. 
80 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
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be less vulnerable than camp refugees, except in cases whereby refugees might face persecution within 
the camps, such as because of their sexual orientation. For a summary of the resettlement process from 
Nairobi, see diagram in Annex 5. 
Decision making 
In the camps and Nairobi there is no standard resettlement process by UNHCR, which operates on a 
case by case basis. Refugees may be called for a number of interviews before a decision is made on 
their eligibility for resettlement. Once cases are found to be eligible for resettlement and UNHCR has 
identified a p otential country of resettlement, UNHCR issues the refugee with a su bmission letter 
which states which country they have been recommended to. In Kakuma, in situations where an 
individual or family is suspected of fraud with regards to their resettlement case (such as inventing or 
fabricating an insecurity claim), UNHCR will keep the case on hold, conducting further interviews or 
investigations and, if the case continues to appear suspicious, ultimately referring the case to an 
oversight panel which conducts its own investigations. Should it be concluded that the refugee(s) in 
question are guilty of fraud, they are called to the office of the Resettlement Officer and informed that 
their case has been rejected for that reason. Officially, UNHCR has a sanctions system which excludes 
refugees from the resettlement process for three to twelve years, though this is not always 
implemented.81
Resettlement from Kenya in recent years has largely taken place from Kenya’s (and indeed the 
world’s) largest refugee camp, Dadaab. UNHCR’s targets for resettlement were high due to the vast 
numbers of refugees living in Dadaab, many of whom were protracted cases; in 2011, 10,000 
individuals were targeted for resettlement, with 8,000 of those refugees selected from Dadaab. 
However, heightened insecurity in Dadaab over the past two years has led a number of countries to 
withdraw their personnel from conducting resettlement interviews in the camp, curtailing UNHCR’s 
target figures from Kenya in 2012 to 3,750, with only 750 refugees coming from Dadaab.
 If refugees have cases pending with UNHCR, they may enquire about the status of 
their case at UNHCR field posts in Kakuma 1 and 3 sections of the camp, held every Friday morning. 
Field posts are run by two UNHCR resettlement caseworkers, who are able to check on refugees’ 
cases via connecting to an online database. Caseworkers are able to serve 45 refugees, who gain a 
place in the queue by taking a token from the field post a week earlier which entitles them to be seen 
the following week.  
82 This has 
created a real challenge for UNHCR, as r esettlement countries scramble for refugees from a much 
smaller pool of candidates in order to meet their resettlement quotas. Furthermore, many of Dadaab’s 
protracted refugees are most in need of resettlement, but remain largely inaccessible. UNHCR has 
been exploring alternative methodologies through which refugees submitted for resettlement can be 
accessed by interviews for third countries, including video conferencing (piloted with Canada in July 
2012).83 In addition, PRM, U.S. State Department has provided funding for the transfer of 2,000 
Somali refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma, facilitated by IOM, for processing by RSC, which has not 
been allowed to access Dadaab for the past two years. Plans are currently in place for the construction 
of shelters in Kakuma to accommodate these families and individuals as they are being processed for 
resettlement to the U.S. Alternatives were also found for Sweden, which interviewed around 250 
refugees from Dadaab in September 2012 in Nairobi, funding IOM’s operation of securely 
transporting two cohorts of refugees to Nairobi by bus,84
                                                     
81 Interview with UNHCR Resettlement Officer, Kakuma, 18 September 2012. 
 and accommodating them in IOM’s transit 
centre near Wilson Airport. These measures are of course costly, and, in the case of Sweden, meant 
82 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. Countries are unlikely to be willing to 
resettle refugees on a dossier basis, since the security risks associated with Somalis has rendered face to face interviews a 
requirement. 
83 UNHCR, 2012c. 
84 The road from Dadaab is highly dangerous, with frequent attacks by bandits. 
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that the numbers of refugees requested for submission by UNHCR was curtailed from 350 to 300 (50 
of the refugees were selected from Nairobi) because the cost of transporting and accommodating them 
was simply too high. In addition, the cultural orientation programme which takes place during the 
selection mission was cut from three days of classes to just a one hour session.85
5. European Countries’ Resettlement Processes From Kenya 
  
Overview 
In 2012, three EU member states carried out selection missions in Kenya: Sweden, the UK and the 
Netherlands. Sweden has been conducting selection missions in Kenya since 2009 and has prioritised 
the Horn for resettlement for the past two years (previously priority was given to the Middle East). 
The Netherlands have been resettling from Kenya on a r egular basis since 2007. Denmark has not 
conducted selection missions in Kenya for the past two years, but did so in 2010, during which 124 
Congolese and two Burundians were selected for resettlement.86 At the time of this report’s 
completion, the UK Home Office was unable to provide information about the history of the country’s 
resettlement from Kenya. Other EU member states carry out resettlement from Kenya on a dossier or 
emergency basis according to UNHCR’s requests, but it was not possible to capture this data since 
records tend to show the refugees’ countries of origin as opposed to country of first asylum.87 Dossier 
submissions are typically made through UNHCR’s regional hub office in Nairobi. A number of 
European countries allocate a proportion of their annual quota to dossier and emergency cases which 
can be turned around in a relatively short space of time. As described above, this is an important 
facility for UNHCR and urgent cases, and is particularly highly valued since it is not offered by all 
resettlement countries. Of Sweden’s worldwide resettlement quota of 1,900, about half is reserved for 
dossier cases, and 350 of them are reserved specifically for emergency cases.88 For the Netherlands, of 
its global quota of 500, 100 resettlement positions are reserved for medical cases and family 
reunification.89 The UK has no specific quota for emergency or medical cases, but can accept up to 40 
cases via Romania’s Emergency Transit Centre in Timisoara and three per cent of its quota for 
emergency medical cases.90 On a d ossier basis, UNHCR need only submit a file on the refugee 
individual or family, which is considered by the country of resettlement to be adequate information for 
the resettlement process to go ahead. However, in certain cases countries do require doing a face to 
face interview. Sweden, for example, must interview Somali refugees before accepting them for 
resettlement, even in case of an emergency, and the Netherlands is currently piloting video 
conferencing with refugees who are submitted for resettlement on a dossier basis.91
Referral and selection processes 
  
For non-dossier or emergency cases, the resettlement process to European countries begins with the 
countries announcing their plans to conduct missions in Kenya, and the number of refugees they 
intend to select for resettlement. This communication tends to occur in January following decisions on 
                                                     
85 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
86 Email correspondence with the Danish Immigration Services, 27 September 2012. 
87 France, Switzerland and Finland resettle on an ad-hoc dossier basis from Kenya. IOM Operation Manager for non-U.S. 
movements, interviewed Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
88 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
89 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012.  
90 Know Reset data on the United Kingdom. www.knowreset.eu  
91 Interviews with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012, and Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 
August 2012.  
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global resettlement quotas for the following fiscal year, and often involve giving UNHCR relatively 
short notice ahead of the missions.92 The exception here is Sweden, which announced its quota for the 
following year to UNHCR in December and its plans to conduct its selection mission in the spring 
(though this was postponed to September due to the security issues in Dadaab).93 UNHCR sends the 
resettlement country a questionnaire requiring specification of the kinds of cases the country is looking 
for. Sweden, on UNHCR’s recommendation, specified that it wished to select 350 Somali refugees, 
with the majority residing in Dadaab. All cases to be resettled to Sweden are required to need 
alternative protection, described as “ otherwise in need of protection” in Swedish alien law. This 
includes vulnerable families (including female-headed families), minority groups (in the Somali case, 
minority clans and religious minorities), and medical cases (though medical cases are also required to 
have additional protection needs).94 Following an initial plan to also resettle Somalis from Dadaab, the 
UK this year specified that it only wished to select Ethiopian Oromo refugees for resettlement from 
Kakuma and Nairobi, and instead of resettling from Dadaab selected Congolese refugees from 
Tanzania.95 At the time of this report’s completion, the Home Office was unable to provide 
information about the kinds of cases prioritised by the UK for resettlement. The Netherlands specified 
that it w ished to resettle non-Somali refugees.96 Otherwise, priority is given to victims of trauma, 
women at risk and medical emergencies.97 In addition, the Netherlands seeks a balanced caseload, 
consisting of families, women at risk and single men, and refugees’ ‘integration potential’ is a 
determining factor of their selection.98
On receiving the completed questionnaire, UNHCR goes about identifying cases to submit to the 
country of resettlement in response to the requirements that have been specified, and Resettlement 
Referral Forms (RRFs) for each case selected.
  
99 RRFs have seven sections, including information on 
the country of origin, and there is currently some debate on whether all this information is needed for 
all resettlement countries and whether the referral process can be streamlined to save time and 
resources.100 The referral process can be rushed for UNHCR, especially since they tend to be short-
staffed at the beginning of the year.101 Cases may have been earmarked ahead of countries announcing 
their missions, but it is an objective of UNHCR to have pools of RRFs prepared in advance, even if at 
the time of completion no potential country of resettlement has been identified. This lesson was 
learned this year, when the UK specified that it required Oromo cases, and there was a lack of Oromo 
cases prepared for referral since there are often challenges around resettling Oromo to UNHCR’s 
biggest customer, the U.S.102 UNHCR was thus this year faced with preparing over 200 RRFs for 
Oromo refugees in Kakuma and Nairobi for submission to the UK at relatively short notice.103
                                                     
92 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
  
93 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012.  
94 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
95 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012; with IOM Operations Manager for non-US 
movements, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
96 According to COA, the decision to select non-Somali refugees was based on the already significant numbers of Somalis 
seeking asylum in the Netherlands irregularly, and a t endency to experience difficulties with Somalis’ legal claims, 
especially around family compositionInterview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
97 Government of Netherlands, 2011 ‘Chapter on the Netherlands, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011’. 
98 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012.  
99 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012.  
100 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
101 This is due to their contracting of International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) personnel whose contacts tend to 
be 6 monthly and come to an end by December 31st. Interview with Refugee Coordinator, US State Department PRM, 
Nairobi, 11 September 2012.  
102 Oromo often fail to clear U.S. security checks due to the country’s ‘material support’ clause of the Patriot Act, put in 
place by the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11. The clause specifies that no individual who has provided material 
support to any ‘terrorist’ organisations, which includes rebel movements seeking to overthrow ruling governments, shall 
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On receiving the RRFs, countries process the forms, and conduct security checks on the cases. 
Countries may carry out their own screening on the cases based on their own excludability criteria and 
processes if they differ from UNHCR’s. For example, the UK will do their own exclusion assessment 
on receiving the RRFs, and the Netherlands brings an exclusion expert with them on the selection 
mission. Sweden, on the other hand, tends to rely upon UNHCR’s exclusion criteria, and only seeks 
further consultation with UNHCR if during an interview with a refugee there is some contradictory or 
inconsistent information to that on the RRF.104 If at the pre-mission stage countries screen out any of 
the cases referred by UNHCR based on their own excludability criteria or security checks, they may 
contact UNHCR to request submission of additional RRFs in order for the country to meet their 
resettlement quotas. For Sweden, no cases were screened out at this initial stage this year.105 The 
Netherlands did not specify the number of cases that were screened out at this stage, but of the 80-100 
forms they requested, 70-80 refugees were selected for resettlement. One Oromo refugee informant in 
Kakuma reported receiving a su bmission letter from UNHCR stating that his case had been 
recommended to the Netherlands, but was not contacted by the Netherlands for an interview, 
suggesting that this case would have been removed at the initial screening stage.106 The British High 
Commission in Nairobi was not aware of the number of cases submitted by UNHCR to the UK that 
were rejected by the Home Office, which was unable to provide this information at the time of the 
report’s completion.107
Once the RRFs have been screened and verified, countries communicate to UNHCR which 
refugees will be interviewed during their selection missions, and arrangements for the mission are 
made accordingly. This year, Sweden conducted all interviews for the 250 Somali refugees from 
Dadaab and 50 Somali refugees from Nairobi in the IOM transit centre in Nairobi (numbers curtailed 
by 50 due to costs, as explained above). Interviews were conducted by a delegation from the Swedish 
Migration Board.
  
108 The Netherlands conducted its mission in Kakuma and Nairobi, interviewing 30 
non-Somali refugees from Kakuma and 50 from Nairobi. The delegation consists of the Immigration 
and Naturalisation Service (IND), which assesses refugees’ legal claims, the Central Agency for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), which conducts ‘social intake’ interviews during which 
refugees’ integration potential is assessed and information is gathered to create a social file for each 
individual for use in the cultural orientation, reception and introduction programmes on arrival in the 
Netherlands, and a medical doctor who conducts a medical assessment for each interviewee.109 In 
recent years, the UK has been spreading the selection of the number of refugees it pledges to resettle 
from Kenya across two to three missions.110 This year, the UK pledged to resettle 140 Oromo in 
Kakuma and 90 in Nairobi, and during its most recent mission in Kenya in June selected 128 refugees 
from both sites. The delegation consists of officers from the UK Borders Agency (UKBA) of the 
Home Office.111
(Contd.)                                                                  
be able to enter the U.S. This has caused many Oromo refugees to be disqualified from resettlement to the U.S. based on 
their (often tenuous) support of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a separatist group promoting the self-determination of 
the Oromo people of Ethiopia, labelled by the Ethiopian government as a ‘terrorist organisation’.  
 In Nairobi, refugees are interviewed at the IOM transit centre, and in Kakuma, 
interviews are conducted in the IOM resettlement processing centre situated in the Kakuma 2 section 
103 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
104 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012.  
105 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012.  
106 Abdi [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012.  
107 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
108 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
109 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012; information on Netherlands resettlement on EU Resettlement 
Network website.  
110 Interview with British High Commission, Nairobi, 10 August 2012.  
111 Resettlement Inter-agency Partnership, 2004, Understanding resettlement to the UK. 
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of the camp.112 In some cases, slight changes can be made to those refugees who are to be interviewed 
ahead of the mission. Sweden, for example, received notification a f ew days before its mission to 
Kenya that five emergency cases would be submitted for resettlement. The delegation conducted 
security checks on these cases during the selection mission, and all five cleared. Due to the costs 
involved in the mission this year for transporting refugees from Dadaab, the submission of the 
additional five cases meant that some refugees on the original list were removed to accommodate the 
emergency cases.113 Because those withdrawn were a family, and two cases did not show up to the 
interview,114
Post-selection 
 the number of refugees interviewed was curtailed to 295 (i.e. it was not possible to 
interview 300 cases as planned).  
Sweden makes decisions on the cases interviewed during the mission, and once all interviews have been 
completed holds a meeting with UNHCR to discuss the decisions made. This year, Sweden accepted all 
295 refugees interviewed for resettlement. The delegation from the Swedish Migration Board this year 
had the technology to communicate directly with its alien database in Sweden and the municipalities to 
which the refugees will be resettled. They had the equipment to process the travel documents of all the 
refugees in country during the selection mission, and deposited the emergency alien passports for the 
refugees with UNHCR towards the end of the mission. Residence permits take longer to process and are 
produced in Sweden, but should reach the Swedish Embassy in Nairobi for delivery to UNHCR within 3 
weeks. This new system has rendered the Swedish Embassy redundant in the resettlement process, and 
makes the resettlement process more efficient, reducing the time that the selected refugees await 
departure.115 That said, the sticking point is the availability of appropriate accommodation in the 
municipalities, especially for medical cases. Since most refugees are resettled in northern Sweden, where 
the concentration of advanced university hospitals is significantly lower than in the south, it can be 
difficult to find municipalities which can meet the needs of those with medical cases. In addition, 
challenges are encountered when trying to resettle refugees with disabilities, since ground floor 
accommodation or apartment blocks with elevators are not always available. For this reason, the Swedish 
Migration Board currently faces a backlog of cases t o be resettled within the year; at the time of the 
study, around half of the cases t o be resettled that year were yet to depart. Since any refugees not 
departing by 31st December are carried over to the following year, filling up that year’s quota, it is an 
urgent priority of the Swedish Migration Board for as many refugees as possible to depart by the end of 
the year. Originally, the group of 295 r efugees selected from Kenya were intended to be resettled in 
January 2013, y et due to delays on t he resettlement of refugees from other regions, the Swedish 
Migration Board is now aiming to have resettled them by the end of the year. The five urgent cases 
remain a priority, as do a number of other cases pending their security situation in Dadaab. As explained 
above, Sweden’s cultural orientation programme this year consisted of a one hour session, which 
included a 15 minute video about life in Sweden and a brief explanation about air travel. In previous 
years, the cultural orientation programme has been conducted over a three day period, conducted by 
teachers from the municipalities in Sweden where the refugees would be resettled.116
 
 
                                                     
112 Interview rooms were funded by the U.S. and are labelled ‘RSC interview room’ 1, 2, 3, etc. since they are mostly used by 
RSC, but may be used by delegations from any resettlement country. 
113 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
114
 One no-show was a family member who had gone missing. The rest of the family were interviewed. The other no-show 
was a Nairobi-based refugee who had been called on several occasions, but appears to have chosen not to attend. Without 
an interview, refugees are not accepted for resettlement. Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 
September 2012. 
115 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
116 Interview with Swedish Migration Board delegation, Nairobi, 27 September 2012. 
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The Netherlands accepted around 70 r efugees, the majority of cases interviewed, during their 
mission this year, and held a meeting with UNHCR at the end of the mission to discuss the decisions 
made. All of the refugees selected will be resettled to the same municipality, Freisland, where refugees 
from Kenya were also resettled the previous year. A ‘pre-arrival’ phase of six months’ duration 
follows the selection mission. This includes three cultural orientation courses, each conducted over 
four days. Across all of the cultural orientation sessions, 30-40 per cent of the time is allocated to 
Dutch language lessons, on the premise that language is the most important tool for integration. This 
year, COA has piloted additional language lessons for the refugees residing in Nairobi, led by 
volunteer teachers from the Netherlands. Refugees in Nairobi who were seen to experience difficulties 
in the language classes were identified for two additional language lessons per week between cultural 
orientation courses, held at the IOM transit centre. For the stronger students, one additional language 
class per week is taken. The additional lessons are voluntary, but the majority of refugees are keen to 
take them up. T he first cultural orientation session is carried out six to eight weeks following the 
selection mission (this year held in July) the second around a month later, (this year in August), and 
the final session around a month prior to departure (this year held in mid-October). In addition to 
Dutch language, the cultural orientation courses feature information sessions about various aspects of 
life in the Netherlands. The first course focuses on life at the national level, the second at the level of 
the municipality the refugees will be resettled in, and the third at the personal or family level. Subjects 
taught include Dutch law, human rights issues, education, health, traffic rules and regulations, 
budgeting and shopping and income. During the courses, refugees are closely monitored and their files 
kept up to date with any information required by the municipality in which they will be resettled. 
During breaks between sessions, trainers spend time talking with individuals on a one-to-one basis, 
especially those who appear to be struggling to keep up during the classes. In the final session, 
refugees are advised of the housing they will be given, and are shown the accommodation via Google 
Earth. They are also given information about their nearest medical facilities, and the schools their 
children will attend. This year, departure is scheduled for November. The Netherlands Embassy deals 
with the processing of the refugees’ travel documents.117 IOM conducts a fit for travel check for all 
refugees, but the Netherlands does not conduct a full medical screening until arrival, including for 
TB.118 On arrival, refugees are hosted in a hotel near Schiphol airport and undergo 48 hours of checks, 
which include the medical screening, and during which their photographs and fingerprints are taken. 
Following the checks, they are taken to the municipalities, from where further cultural orientation 
takes place, conducted by the local authorities and local NGOs. This year is the second year to carry 
out this post-arrival programme; until the beginning of 2011, resettled refugees on a rrival would be 
hosted in a resettlement centre for 6 months before being transferred to the municipalities. During this 
programme, cultural orientation pre-departure was just one four-day session, since the majority of 
cultural orientation would be delivered from the resettlement centre.119
The UK also accepted ‘the majority’ of refugees interviewed for resettlement, rejecting just three or 
four.
  
120 During the selection mission, refugees’ biometrics and photos are taken, medical assessments 
are conducted by IOM, and the data is left with the embassy in Nairobi. The decision-making process 
is conducted from the UK, following which the decisions are communicated with UNHCR and the 
embassy in Nairobi and travel documents are prepared for the refugees selected and deposited with 
IOM. Refugees usually travel in groups of around twenty, and are resettled together in the same area. 
They are taken to the IOM transit centre, where final medical checks by IOM are conducted before 
departure to ensure that they are fit to travel and free from TB.121
                                                     
117 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
 Sometimes refugees require medical 
118 Interview with IOM sub-office manager, Kakuma, 23 September 2012. 
119 This programme was delivered for four years, and the shift came about with a ch ange of government. It was felt that 
direct transfer to the municipalities was better for refugees’ integration.  
120 Interview with the British High Commission, 10 August 2012. 
121 The UK does not refuse any individual entry on medical grounds but refugees may not travel if they have TB.  
Hannah Elliott 
20 KNOW RESET RR 2012/01 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 
escorts, and these are provided by IOM. Prior to departure, the refugees receive cultural orientation 
training for a day. The cultural orientation focuses on personal hygiene, how to use flush toilets, baths 
and showers, how to conduct oneself on an aeroplane and what to expect on arrival. The time between 
interview and departure is short – usually between one and two months. Further cultural orientation is 
delivered post-arrival.  
Experiences of UNHCR and implementing partners of European resettlement  
Interviews with UNHCR and implementing partners suggested that European resettlement is highly 
valued due to countries’ abilities to resettle cases in short spaces of time and their systems of allocating 
portions of their quotas to dossier cases and emergencies. However, agencies can experience difficulties 
around the time and resources spent meeting the resettlement needs of European countries relative to the 
number of refugees that European countries resettle. This was also expressed from the perspective of 
U.S. State Department PRM, which experiences a lull in resettlement referrals at the beginning of the 
year because UNHCR channels all of its resources into responding to the missions of European 
countries. UNHCR operates in this way because, in spite of long security checks, the U.S. will accept 
large numbers and is relatively open as compared to European countries, which are often deemed to be 
more choosey. The U.S. in particular then tends to get a surge of referrals towards the end of the year, 
once all European resettlement places have been filled. As mentioned above, this is partly a h uman 
resources issue on UNHCR’s part, since the contracts of many of its staff come to an end in December 
which means they are understaffed at the busiest times of the year. Since the U.S. is UNHCR’s biggest 
resettlement ‘customer’, the prioritising of European countries which resettle much lower numbers can 
seem illogical.122 Nevertheless, especially for cases urgently requiring resettlement, or groups or 
nationalities which are less likely to be accepted by the U.S., such as Oromo and Eritreans,123 UNHCR 
feels that prioritising European countries’ resettlement needs is important and necessary. This can result 
in a h ectic first half of the year as r eferrals are being made, until European countries’ missions are 
completed and quotas are filled, including for dossier and emergency cases. Thereafter, UNHCR is able 
to continue referring cases to RSC, and faces the difficult situation of keeping any new emergency cases 
that arise on hold as they await the new fiscal year to begin referring to European countries again. This 
can be particularly stressful, since some of these cases may be in life-threatening situations, and yet there 
tend to be no immediate opportunities for resettlement in the second half of the year. The only way to 
begin addressing this issue would be for those countries which offer resettlement on a dossier basis to 
significantly increase their dossier and emergency quotas in order to make options available for 
emergency cases throughout the year.124 In addition, European countries providing UNHCR with more 
prior warning ahead of missions would enable UNHCR to plan more effectively for the coming year. 
Spacing missions throughout the year would allow UNHCR to spread its time more evenly between the 
various countries resettling from Kenya. This may involve communication between European countries 
conducting resettlement, so that they can plan their various missions through the year accordingly.125
IOM reported similar challenges around working with European countries, each of which has its 
own systems and schedules which can prove cumbersome to deal with when the numbers actually 
resettled are relatively few. Except for the UK, which budgets for its resettlement programme three 
  
                                                     
122 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012; discussions with RSC caseworkers between 
June and September 2012. The Refugee Coordinator, PRM, commented that he repeatedly reminds UNHCR that no 
business survives that gives preference to the smallest customer.  
123 Due to any associations or affiliations with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), also based on the ‘material 
support’ clause referenced above.  
124 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012. 
125 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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years in advance, European countries provide IOM with very tentative ‘hints’ about the numbers they 
might resettle when at the planning stage for the following year.126
Kenya’s resettlement infrastructure, which European countries are able to use to meet their own 
resettlement quotas, is almost entirely funded by the U.S. Although this is logical, since the U.S. is 
UNHCR’s and IOM’s biggest ‘customer’ in resettlement, there is a sense that European countries 
should be more committed to supporting this infrastructure financially, since it depends upon it for its 
resettlement requirements. As it stands, should the U.S. stop resettling from the region, this 
infrastructure could not be maintained with the relatively insignificant and ad hoc funding that 
European countries provide; there is a sense that European funding could not be depended upon for 
IOM’s operations. For example, total funds from European resettlement allow IOM Nairobi to employ 
only two full-time national staff to manage operations to European countries.
 
127 In addition, because 
European countries tend to provide little notice on their resettlement numbers, IOM can be forced to 
adjust its operations at the last minute, likely incurring further costs.128
IOM can also experience some challenges around a lack of standardised procedures from 
European countries. For example, some countries require thorough medical checks from IOM, while 
others do not. While the UK and Denmark have a no-travel policy if a refugee is infected with TB, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Finland do not. The Netherlands brings their own medical 
doctor who checks refugees at the selection mission stage for reasons of efficiency.
  
129 While all 
refugees undergo fit for travel checks before departure regardless of their destination, this is not 
enough to diagnose more complex health issues. A standard medical examination for all refugees 
which would help prevent outbreaks, better screening to avoid complications in flight and prevent 
problems after arrival.130 Similarly, there is no standard procedure around cultural orientation. This 
is in large part because different countries have different ideas around what cultural orientation 
should involve, reflected in the very different programmes and curriculums taught as described 
above for Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. In situations where a small number of refugees are 
resettled ahead of a larger cohort due to an urgent need to leave Kenya, countries may contract IOM 
to conduct the training. The Netherlands, for example, asks IOM to do four days’ training with 
refugees who are not able to participate in its own extensive cultural orientation programme and 
provide IOM with a curriculum.131 Although the Netherlands would fund this directly, the time 
spent by the manager of cultural orientation at IOM is not accounted for, since such requests have 
an ad hoc nature.132
While European countries are highly valued for their capacity to take dossier and emergency 
submissions and for the speed with which they can resettle refugees, they are also perceived as being 
somewhat choosey about the refugees they accept for resettlement, and not necessarily according to 
individuals’ and families’ vulnerability. For example, the UK’s decision this year to only take Oromo 
refugees from Kenya and the Netherlands’ request for non-Somali refugees were experienced 
 This is again an example of how implementing agencies must respond to 
European countries needs around resettlement on an ad hoc basis, using resources which are largely 
funded by larger resettlement actors. 
                                                     
126 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
127 It was noted the salaries of whom alone are likely higher than the total funding IOM receives from European 
countries on an annual basis. 
128 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
129
 Communication with COA, Netherlands, 10 October 2012. 
130 Interview with IOM Operations Manager for non-U.S. movements, 10 August 2012. 
131 Interview with Netherlands COA, Nairobi, 30 August 2012. 
132 Interview with Canada’s Cultural Orientation Abroad Global Project Manager, Nairobi, 10 August 2012. The position of 
the manager of cultural orientation at IOM is funded by Canada because Canada is IOM’s biggest customer in terms of 
cultural orientation. In the past IOM has conducted cultural orientation for refugees being resettled to the U.S., but the 
contract is currently held by CWS who also have the contract for RSC.  
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problematically by UNHCR, since third countries seen to be favouring or discriminating against 
specific ethnic groups undermines UNHCR’s efforts to make resettlement appear fair and entirely 
according to need and causes refugees to complain about what they perceive as bias and racism (see 
following section).133 Countries assessing the ‘integration potential’ of refugees were also criticised, 
since they tend to select refugees according to their education levels and language skills as opposed to 
on a needs-based assessment.134
Few agency staff interviewed were aware of any changes yet brought about by the Joint European 
Resettlement Programme (JERP) which was passed through the European Parliament in March 2012. 
However, UNHCR’s Senior Resettlement Officer in Nairobi noted that the German Embassy in 
Nairobi had recently requested a meeting with UNHCR to discuss resettlement from Kenya for the 
following year, which she suggested was a response to the JERP’s identification of Kenya as a priority 
country of first asylum from which to conduct resettlement.  
  
6. Refugee Narratives, Perspectives And Experiences Of Resettlement 
Resettlement has become a highly desired commodity for refugees both in camp and urban settings; 
resettlement is often perceived as something that is attainable or can be actively achieved. While those 
refugees and asylum seekers interviewed recognised that resettlement is something that refugees 
should need as opposed to desire, the majority had strong narratives and claims which depicted 
themselves as in need of resettlement. This is not something that should necessarily be disputed or 
questioned; undoubtedly refugees in both camp and urban settings are forced to live in extremely 
challenging circumstances. However, some refugees are of course more vulnerable than others, and 
these are the individuals and families who are sought out by UNHCR and implementing partners. 
The following subsections explore the resettlement contexts in Nairobi and Kakuma and the 
narratives, perspectives and experiences around resettlement of those refugees who were interviewed 
across the two sites.  
Who seeks resettlement? 
A situation of generalised insecurity in Kakuma or Nairobi is not considered sufficient grounds by 
UNHCR for the resettlement of refugees; rather, refugees should have a protection need that is specific 
to them as individuals or families in order to be referred for resettlement. However, the majority of 
refugees want resettlement since, regardless of individual circumstances, life in both the camps and 
Nairobi is extremely challenging and many hold onto the dream of a b etter life abroad. Because 
refugees are aware to an extent of the reasons refugees are referred to be resettled in a third country – 
i.e. extreme vulnerability or insecurity – it is not uncommon for refugees to ‘negotiate 
vulnerability’,135
Who does not seek resettlement? 
 highlighting their cases of insecurity and sometimes embellishing these situations. 
Agencies also spoke of refugees sometimes ‘creating’ situations of vulnerability in order to get 
resettlement.  
Very few informants had no interest in resettlement, or had not explored at least some means through 
which to obtain it. All of the refugees interviewed in the camp were acutely aware of resettlement; 
weekly postings of ration card numbers of refugees called for resettlement interviews with UNHCR, 
                                                     
133 Interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Kakuma, 19 September 2012 
134 Interview with UNHCR Senior Resettlement Officer, Nairobi, 14 August 2012 
135 Cf. Jansen, 2008. 
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RSC and delegations from resettlement countries as well as frequent flights departing out of the camp 
carrying refugees selected for resettlement makes resettlement a highly visible practice on almost a 
daily basis. A minority of the refugees interviewed in Nairobi, however, were less resettlement aware 
or savvy. Four of the South Sudanese refugees interviewed in Nairobi had little to say about 
resettlement, and were much less familiar with the language of resettlement. One Somali young 
woman working for an NGO in the city who had waited two years for feedback from an interview with 
RSC suggested that she had no inclination to waste any more time and energy chasing up her case, and 
that she would rather remain in Nairobi than stress herself with pursuing resettlement.136 An interview 
with one Oromo informant highlighted how very vulnerable refugees may not have the capacity to 
seek out resettlement; his mandate expired in 2004 and he claimed not to have returned to the UNHCR 
office since to renew it due to his anxieties around travelling far from home.137
How is resettlement sought? 
  
A number of informants in both Kakuma and Nairobi seemed to have made attaining resettlement a 
project to actively work on through certain practices or methods, such as regular visits to UNHCR and 
implementing partners, writing letters to submit to the UNHCR offices and collecting papers 
documenting their suffering, mistreatment or the unfairness of UNHCR’s policies and practices. It is 
important to note that for refugees, in camps especially, who may have little control over their lives, 
daily engagement with such a project may be one of the few ways they feel able to gain some agency 
or autonomy, and maintain some hope in an otherwise bleak situation. Saida, a Somali refugee and 
single mother making a l iving in Nairobi’s Eastleigh selling foodstuffs such as ghee and dried meat 
from an open-air stall, said that since she received her mandate she has sought assistance from 
numerous agencies, including Kituo Cha Sheria and RCK,138 telling them of the challenges she faces 
in Nairobi, since that is a way through which one might be referred for resettlement.139 A number of 
Congolese refugees spoke of writing letters to UNHCR describing their hardships in Nairobi. One 
informant described writing letter after letter, week after week, until he lost heart after never receiving 
a single reply.140 In Kakuma, there was more evidence of group action, likely because of the close 
proximity within which refugees live. A group of South Sudanese Dinka informants, for example, 
showed me a letter complaining of the lack of resettlement opportunities for South Sudanese since 
independence, requesting that UNHCR reconsider granting them resettlement.141 An Oromo informant 
informed me that a group of 50 refugees of Ethiopian nationality from one section of the camp who 
had arrived between 1992 and 1999 and yet remained in the camp whilst other such early arrivals had 
since been resettled submitted a letter to UNHCR to remind the agency of their protracted situation.142 
Similarly, a Burundian refugee told me of collective action by himself and ten other Burundians whose 
resettlement cases had long been pending with UNHCR without being informed why; the group went 
directly to talk to the Resettlement Officer in the UNHCR compound.143
 
  
                                                     
136 Asha, interviewed Nairobi, 25 July 2012.  
137 Boru, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012. 
138 Three informants mentioned that RCK had referred their cases and that they expected this to be to HIAS, recommending 
them for resettlement, although they were not advised of this. None of them, however, had received any further feedback, 
and felt that the organisation had given them false hope. Naima [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Fatuma 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 11 August 2012; Saida [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012.  
139 Saida, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
140 Joseph, interviewed Nairobi, 28 August 2012. 
141 Interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012. 
142 Jarso, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
143 Thomas, interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
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Some informants reported seeking resettlement through family reunification, but failing due to 
tenuous biological relationships. This could have ramifications for refugees’ resettlement chances later 
down the line. Abdullahi, for example, a refugee residing in Nairobi but officially registered in 
Kakuma, reported his family attempting reunification with a cousin in the U.S. in 2006 but failing at 
the DNA test. Although they had arrived in Kenya in 1992, and thus should have been referred for 
resettlement some time ago based on their protracted situation, the reunification case stalled their 
resettlement case, which was only reactivated this year, and due to their failure to the U.S. they had 
been referred to Canada.144 Another Somali informant, this time in Kakuma, recounted how her family 
had attempted ‘reunification’ with a family friend who had been resettled in the U.S., and to do so had 
changed their family name, year of arrival and reported only having resided in Nairobi. Having passed 
through interviews with RSC, UNHCR was required to retrieve the family’s file. This required giving 
their fingerprints, at which point it was realised that they had been registered with different details. As 
punishment for fraudulent activity, on return to Kakuma the family were told that they would be put to 
the bottom of the pile for the protracted resettlement programme in spite of being amongst the earliest 
1992 arrivals to Kenya.145 Since, their case has remained ‘pending’. Five out of ten South Sudanese 
refugees in Nairobi (of both Dinka and Nuer ethnicities) spoke of a ‘form’ which they had completed 
in Kakuma in 2004/5 which sought resettlement in Australia through ‘reunification’ with South 
Sudanese people in the diaspora. These individuals were not usually relatives but shared the same 
ethnic group as the refugees. All of the informants had received rejection letters from the Australian 
embassy.146 One informant mentioned paying $50 t o employ somebody to help him complete the 
form.147 Refugees’ desires and even desperation for resettlement can itself render refugees vulnerable 
to scams, as well as manipulative or even violent family relations. Saida described contacting relatives 
who had been resettled in Australia requesting them to call for her as a family reunification case. The 
relatives responded that she would need to marry a r elative, whom she had not met but had heard 
negative things about. When she refused to marry, they cut contact with her.148
Selection stage 
  
Many more refugees seek resettlement than are actually successful in achieving it. Refugees were 
found to have a variety of explanations for why some refugees are successful and others are not, or 
why some refugees go through the selection process and depart within a relatively short space of time 
while others can wait for a number of years. Some Oromo refugees in Nairobi noted that those who 
fled Ethiopia with documentation that proved their persecution had a better chance of being 
resettled,149 although one who had formerly worked for an Oromo rights organisation and claimed to 
have carried documents had waited over ten years for resettlement, and attributed this to being 
received by national staff as opposed to international staff at UNHCR.150 Some of the Oromo refugees 
interviewed in Nairobi were known by Oromo rights activist Dr. Trueman, who had highlighted their 
individual cases to UNHCR and recommended them for resettlement.151
 
  
                                                     
144 Abdullahi, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
145 Zahra, interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012. 
146 Angelina, interviewed Nairobi, 13 A ugust 2012; James, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Daniel, interviewed 
Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Sam, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012; Esther, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012.  
147 Sam, interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012.  
148 Saida, interviewed Nairobi, 26 July 2012. 
149 Abdikadir, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Hussein, interviewed Nairobi, 
17 July 2012; Malik, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012.  
150 Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012.  
151 Said, interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 
July 2012. 
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A number of informants also explained selection and rejection of refugees as occurring unfairly. 
Unfairness was explained in a n umber of ways. Some refugees suggested that resettlement occurs 
arbitrarily and that selection was largely based on chance or luck.152 This was often expressed in 
relation to the officer one was received by; refugees in Kakuma in particular claimed that national staff 
were less sympathetic or willing to help refugees than international staff, sometimes because Kenyan 
staff were jealous of refugees’ resettlement opportunities and would thus sabotage their cases.153 
Unfairness was also articulated as being because UNHCR and resettlement countries favoured 
particular nationalities or tribes. This was particularly strongly articulated by informants in Kakuma; 
because of the proximity in which refugees live and the visibility of resettlement, refugees are acutely 
aware of who is and who is not being resettled – the majority of informants commented that the U.K. 
only wanted Oromo refugees, for example.154 In Nairobi, such comments were less common, though a 
number of Congolese Banyamulenge said that they felt that UNHCR and resettlement countries were 
biased against them since they tended to select other nationalities and even Congolese tribes.155 
Favouring certain ethnic groups was often accounted for by South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer 
refugees as being racist; informants pointed out that ‘brown’ refugees such as Oromo and Somalis 
were being resettled but ‘black’ refugees were not, even if, like the Ethiopian Nuer, they shared the 
same nationality with those who were being resettled, like the Oromo.156 Some informants asserted 
that other refugees bought or stole other people’s resettlement places, especially in the camps, 
including people’s ‘forms’.157 Camp informants also commented that some refugees fake situations of 
insecurity,158 or would change their ethnicity strategically having observed that certain ethnic groups 
were more favoured than others.159 Some refugees also cited mistrust of UNHCR,160 or suspicion of 
corruption within the organisation, as being behind resettlement decisions.161 An Oromo informant in 
Kakuma presented me with a n ewspaper article from 2008 entitled ‘Kenyans fall prey to refugee 
registration scam’, describing how Kenyan Somalis were posing as Ethiopian refugees in order to be 
resettled. Annotated underneath the text was written “UNHCR is the most corrupt organisation in the 
world. By a mistreated refugee”.162
                                                     
152 Joseph [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 28 August 2012; Fatuma [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 11 August 2012. 
 Two Oromo refugees mentioned that they had even come to 
153 Hassan [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Arthur [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Julius [Amhara], interviewed 
Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
154 Hassan [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Joyce [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Lam [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012; John [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Michael [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed 20 S eptember 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed 
Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Stephen [South Sudanese Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Julius 
[Amhara], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012.  
155 Andre, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 August 2012. 
156 Lam [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012; Nicholas [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; John [Ethiopian Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Joshua [South Sudanese Dinka], 
interviewed Kakuma, 20 September 2012. South Sudanese in Kakuma claimed to feel that UNHCR’s racism was a more 
logical explanation for South Sudanese being excluded from group resettlement programmes than the official explanation 
– i.e. South Sudan’s independence. 
157 Leila and Mohamed [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 27 July 2012; Yusuf [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; Sagale 
[Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012; James [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Nairobi, 27 August 2012. 
158 Discussion with Dinka refugees, Kakuma, 20 September 2012. 
159 Stephen [South Sudanese Nuer], interviewed Kakuma, 20 S eptember 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 
September 2012; Yusuf [Somali Bantu], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012. 
160 Abdikadir [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012; Malik [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012; 
161 Adan [Oromo], interviewed Nairobi, 21 July 2012; Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
162 Jarso, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
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suspect some staff at UNHCR to be agents of the Ethiopian government.163 South Sudanese Dinka 
refugees expressed suspicion that the Lost Boys resettlement programme was halted before completion 
because 9/11 occurred when U.S. immigration officers were carrying out a mission in the camp; the 
events in New York caused them to leave and they never came back.164
These explanations, although seemingly irrational, do not arise out of nowhere, although I should 
add that this does not mean they are accurate reflections of the way UNHCR operates in Kakuma or 
Nairobi. Especially for the Oromo, a history of persecution may lead refugees to mistrust and be 
paranoid about the activities of all authorities.
 
165 Similarly, for South Sudanese and Ethiopian Nuer 
who have come from countries where their people have been discriminated against racially, it is 
understandable that these refugees would make sense of their apparent unfair treatment through the 
frame of race. In addition, many refugees have come from contexts where corruption is part of 
everyday business, and so to suspect agencies of engaging in corrupt activities around resettlement is 
quite rational. Accusations that national staff are more likely to behave corruptly than international 
staff may be because corruption is assumed to be more prevalent on the continent than in the global 
North. Corruption accusations may also be a legacy of the resettlement scandal of 2000. In addition, a 
general perception of UNHCR as working against refugees may be fostered by its role around RSD; 
from arrival in Kenya, asylum seekers are interviewed and their claims questioned and judged by 
UNHCR.166
Resettlement interviews stage 
 This goes some way towards explaining why UNHCR may receive such strong criticism 
from refugees as compared to implementing partners, which are able to focus their time and resources 
on supporting refugees as opposed to determining whether they qualify to receive their support or not. 
Accusations of corruption, inhumanity and mistreatment by UNHCR are used by refugees to make 
sense of the often frustratingly slow processes they undergo with the agency, not only for those who 
have resettlement cases but also for those who are seeking the most essential protection tool and 
prerequisite to resettlement, the mandate. 
Most refugees commented that the resettlement interview with UNHCR was much like that of RSD, 
mainly exploring the reason for flight, but with additional questions around challenges faced in Kenya. 
In Kakuma especially, a number of refugees commented that they had been called for the same 
interview on more than one occasion, where they were asked the same questions, likely because there 
were some inconsistencies or contradictions in their accounts that UNHCR needed to verify. For 
refugees in Nairobi, this can be stressful financially, since they may have to pay public transport costs 
in order to attend multiple interviews. A couple of informants noted, with reference to both the RSD 
process and resettlement interviews, that it was natural that their stories would be inconsistent 
considering the trauma they had been through and the time that had passed since they fled their 
countries of origin, and that UNHCR should be more mindful of this.167 One Oromo informant in 
Nairobi commented that within his community it was popularly felt that interviews with UNHCR and 
resettlement countries actively tried to catch them out, especially when it came to questions around 
OLF support.168
 
  
                                                     
163 Hussein, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012; Ibrahim, interviewed Nairobi, 17 July 2012. 
164
 Dinka group discussion, Kakuma, 20 September 2012.  
165 This point is made with regards to the Oromo context in Trueman (2010). 
166 Konzolo, 2010: 11.  
167 Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Jonathan [Congolese], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 
2012.  
168 Galgallo, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012.  
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Congolese Banyamulenge refugees in Nairobi expressed concern that during interviews with 
UNHCR (for both RSD and resettlement) and resettlement countries their stories were not being 
accurately translated; interpreters tend to be Rwandan Kinyarwanda or Kirundi speakers, languages 
which are closely related but not identical to the Banyamulenge mother tongue – Kinyamulenge.169 
One informant was rejected resettlement to a country170 following his interview, and felt that this was 
because of inaccurate translation; the interview with UNHCR was conducted in Kiswahili,171 and went 
well, but during the interview with the resettlement country officers the interviewer responded badly, 
even though he gave the same account as in the interview with UNHCR.172
Pending cases 
  
A significant number of refugees had had an initial resettlement interview with UNHCR but then had 
not received any feedback for many months, or even years.173 In such situations, refugees are able to 
enquire about the status of their cases at field post, though some reported receiving contradictory 
information from caseworkers.174 One informant mentioned that one week he would be told that there 
was ‘backlog’, another time that his case was ‘pending’, and not fully understanding the meaning of 
these terms.175 Where informants’ cases were pending, three in Kakuma asserted that UNHCR should 
just come out and tell them what the problem was, expressing the psychological and practical 
difficulties of living in limbo.176 One informant said that she felt that UNHCR’s claim that her 
family’s case was at ‘panel’ was an attempt to fob them off, and that she’d rather they just told them 
directly whether they were successful or not.177 Another described how he had felt unable to make any 
future plans or travel out of the camp because it was possible that he might be called for an interview. 
In his opinion, UNHCR kept refugees in limbo because they were afraid to upset them by telling them 
the truth: that they had been rejected for resettlement.178 Two informants were critical of field post, 
expressing suspicion that it was established simply to keep refugees away from the UNHCR 
compound and deceive any visitors to the camp that everything was in order.179
                                                     
169 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Andre, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012; Juliet, interviewed Nairobi, 22 
August 2012. One Burundian Tutsi informant in Nairobi also suggested that she was rejected the mandate when she first 
came to Kenya because of a problem with the interpreter. Sarah, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012. 
 For refugees whose 
cases have moved beyond UNHCR’s assessment and selection process, queries about their cases may 
not be answerable at field post, as the cases are now with the countries of resettlement to which they 
have been referred. 
170 The country will not be mentioned for confidentiality reasons as requested by the informant. 
171 Some Congolese refugees speak Kiswahili, though Congolese Kiswahili is distinctive from Kenyan Kiswahili. 
172 David, interviewed Nairobi, 21 August 2012.  
173 Joyce [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Zahra [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012; 
Julius [Amhara], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Juliet [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 22 August 2012. 
174 Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 S eptember 2012; Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 
2012; Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Ann [South Sudanese Dinka], interviewed Kakuma, 20 
September 2012; Abdi [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012.  
175 Gufu [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012.  
176 Such comments were also made with regards to decisions about the mandate. 
177 Zahra [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 23 September 2012.  
178 Thomas [Burundian], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012. 
179 Jilo [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Jarso [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
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A number of refugees who had gone through interviews with RSC and INS had waited for long 
periods of time without any information about their cases,180 as UNHCR was not always able to 
inform them of the status of their cases. Only one informant mentioned communicating with INS via 
email with the help of an English speaker from his community.181 For refugees referred by UNHCR to 
European countries, acceptance is more likely and if they are unsuccessful, refugees are informed 
within a short space of time. That said, one informant who had been recommended for resettlement to 
the Netherlands was not called for interview, which implies that his case was rejected by the 
Netherlands at the initial screening stage. He expressed anger and frustration to have seen others be 
interviewed without being informed why he was not called himself. He claimed to have enquired with 
UNHCR about this without receiving an answer.182
A number of other informants felt, or had been informed by UNHCR, that their complex family 
situations were causing their cases to be put on hold.
  
183 Many refugees have come from contexts 
whereby orphaned or abandoned children are absorbed into other family units, whether these are part 
of extended family configurations or wider clan networks. These tend not to be recognised by UNHCR 
or countries of resettlement as constituting genuine families, which require further investigations to 
prove their authenticity. One young Oromo woman in Kakuma reported registering with another 
family on arrival having lost her own, since to live alone, especially as a young woman, would not be 
advisable or culturally acceptable.184 Later, when it came to being referred for resettlement based on 
the family’s year of arrival, when it became apparent that she was not related to the family she 
registered with, the case was put on hold. Another informant, a Somali woman, came to Kenya with 
the family of her father’s second wife (whom she called mother as she lost her mother when she was 
very young) after her father was killed in Somalia. The family successfully went through the interview 
process with UNHCR and were referred on to RSC, but then stalled at the DNA test with INS which 
showed that she was not biologically related to her ‘mother’. The family departed for the U.S. without 
her and she remains in the camp.185
Experiences of those being resettled  
 
Those informants who had been accepted for resettlement by European countries generally reported 
positive experiences during interviews which were conducted in a friendly and relaxed manner. They 
also had a clear sense of the timeframe ahead of them in the build-up to resettlement. Abdikadir, for 
example, an Oromo refugee in Nairobi awaiting resettlement to the Netherlands, recounted to me the 
dates of the three cultural orientation sessions (one of which he had already participated in), the 
content that they would cover in these sessions and the month of his departure.186
                                                     
180 Suleiman [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 S eptember 2012; Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 S eptember 
2012; Muslima [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Kadija [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 
2012; Asha [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 25 July 2012; Sagale [Somali], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012. 
 Those going through 
the resettlement process to the U.S. generally were less clear on the process ahead of them as a result 
of the long security checks on their cases. Two refugees had gone through medical checks and cultural 
orientation without having any real idea of when they might actually depart, and expressed some doubt 
as to whether this would actually ever happen. This situation of limbo was expressed to be 
psychologically very difficult. Of the few refugees who were interviewed who were expecting 
181 Ahmed [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012. 
182 Abdi [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012. 
183 Elias [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; Amina [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012; 
Sahara [Oromo], interviewed Kakuma, 22 September 2012; Kadija [Somali], interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012; 
Angela [Congolese], interviewed Nairobi, 28 July 2012.  
184 Amina, interviewed Kakuma, 21 September 2012. 
185 Kadija, interviewed Kakuma, 19 September 2012. 
186 Abdikadir, interviewed Nairobi, 16 July 2012.  
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imminent departure, none suggested that they were especially more entitled to resettlement than 
others, and my impression was that there was a sense that some refugees are lucky and some are not, 
and that the system largely remains unfair.  
7. Conclusions And Recommendations 
Refugee resettlement from Kenya is a complex operation, involving multiple actors and checks and 
balances in order to minimise corruption and fraud opportunities and ensure that the most vulnerable 
refugees are resettled. Because resettlement is so desired by refugees, in part the result of romantic 
notions of life in the west which have become more tangible through new communications 
technologies and compounded by the visibility of resettlement (in the camps especially), resettlement 
actors are engaged in a constant battle to maintain the credibility of their referrals to third countries 
whilst refugees adapt to changing policies and adjust their resettlement or protection claims 
accordingly. This results in a cu lture of disbelief within agencies and policies around resettlement 
which are experienced by refugees as stringent and draconian, explained and made sense of in multiple 
ways, including unfairness, bias and corruption.  
Refugees might benefit from clearer communication around the statuses of their cases, especially in 
situations where they are pending for long periods. Although it is understandable that UNHCR and 
resettlement countries would not communicate the reasons for refugees being rejected resettlement for 
purposes of keeping selection criteria secret (so that refugees are not able to mould their cases to these 
criteria), not knowing why one was rejected, especially after the stress of going through multiple 
interviews, and the resulting lack of closure can be traumatic for refugees. Similarly, where refugees 
are screened out when UNHCR submits the RRFs to a country, they might benefit from being 
informed of the fact, and advised of why they were not selected for interview. UNHCR and 
resettlement countries ought to have high standards when it comes to selecting interpreters and be 
mindful of Congolese refugees’ (especially Banyamulenge) concerns around translation, ensuring that 
appropriate interpreters are employed.  
For refugees and asylum seekers in Nairobi, support with transport costs to multiple interviews for 
both RSD and resettlement would ease the financial pressures on refugees, especially during the 
period they await the mandate when they are not entitled to other forms of support from UNHCR or 
implementing partners.187
European countries play an important role in Kenya’s resettlement landscape, resettling refugees 
from nationalities which may not be considered by bigger resettlement actors and making provisions 
for emergency and dossier referrals. European countries should increase quotas for emergency and 
dossier referrals in order to meet the resettlement needs of refugees in acute insecurity and medical 
situations. European countries coordinating and spacing their missions throughout the year would 
enable UNHCR to spread its attention more evenly between resettlement countries and avoid having to 
channel all of its resources into meeting the resettlement requirements of European countries at the 
beginning of the year to the detriment of larger resettlement actors. If European countries coordinated 
their missions together, sending a m ixed team from various countries two to three times a y ear, 
UNHCR’s preparation for and hosting of these missions would be more time and cost-effective.
 Urban refugees could also benefit should UNHCR establish field offices in 
enclaves where numerous refugees reside in which RSD and resettlement interviews could be 
conducted.  
188
 
 
European countries would also make IOM’s work easier to plan and manage should they provide more 
notice on the numbers they intend to resettle each year. 
                                                     
187 An exception is Jesuit Relief Services’ (JRS) food aid to newly arrived asylum seekers.  
188 Interview with Refuge Point, 24 July 2012. 
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UNHCR and implementing agencies would also benefit from more standardised policies of 
European countries; as it stands, countries each have their own policies and requirements, and meeting 
them can prove cumbersome, especially due to the small numbers of refugees that these countries 
resettle and the relatively little funding they provide for these numbers, which is often subject to 
change. UNHCR would save significant time and resources should there be an agreement between all 
resettlement actors about what information is required in the RRF; currently, UNHCR completes all 
forms with the maximum information required since it is not always clear which countries these forms 
will be submitted to. Information on t he political situation in refugees’ countries of origin, for 
example, could probably be removed from the form, since all countries have information and 
publications on these countries from their own foreign offices. UNHCR would also benefit from more 
notice from European countries about their resettlement numbers and the dates of their missions in 
order to target the RRFs more effectively, tailoring each to the needs of the country of submission.189 
In order to assist UNHCR with its human resources issue, European countries could share a small 
clerical office in Nairobi with a Kenyan team through which to channel RRFs, coordinate selection 
missions and arrange interviews. This would be more cost-effective than employing UNHCR staff, 
who are often overqualified for this kind of work.190
European countries might benefit from sharing best practices on resettlement, including on how to 
conduct missions and on cultural orientation programming. Countries could learn from each other by 
sending personnel to shadow other countries’ resettlement missions in Kenya and cultural orientation 
classes. This would also apply to countries which currently do not regularly resettle refugees, or at 
least do not currently carry out selection missions in Kenya.  
 Standardised medical procedures would also help 
to reduce the risk of outbreaks, complications in flight and health problems on arrival.  
 
                                                     
189 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
190 Interview with Refugee Coordinator, U.S. State Department PRM, Nairobi, 11 September 2012. 
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Annex 1. Refugee population in Kenya according to location, 2007-2012 
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Annex 2. Refugees submitted for resettlement, 2007-2012 
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Annex 3. Refugees departing for resettlement, 2007-2012 
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Annex 4. Kakuma refugees: paths to resettlement  
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Annex 5. Urban refugees: paths to resettlement 
 
 
 
